In the Shadow of Glory: Olympic Pageantry and the Disruption of Rio’s Favelas by Jacobs, Elizabeth
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Anthropology Senior Theses Department of Anthropology
Spring 2013
In the Shadow of Glory: Olympic Pageantry and
the Disruption of Rio’s Favelas
Elizabeth Jacobs
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/anthro_seniortheses
Part of the Anthropology Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/anthro_seniortheses/143
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jacobs, Elizabeth, "In the Shadow of Glory: Olympic Pageantry and the Disruption of Rio’s Favelas" (2013). Anthropology Senior
Theses. Paper 143.
In the Shadow of Glory: Olympic Pageantry and the Disruption of Rio’s
Favelas
Abstract
This senior honors thesis explores the changing urban landscape of social inclusion in Rio de Janeiro as the
city prepares itself for the 2016 Olympics. The study is driven by a simple question: who are the winners and
losers in hosting the Games? The city is undergoing a number of infrastructure projects as it prepares for the
Games, capitalizing on Olympic preparations but leaving significant populations of the city ignored.
Combining economic development theory, tourism theory, and displacement theory, I focus on the specific
case of Morro da Providência, Latin America’s oldest favela, to understand the eviction process that 835
families in this community are experiencing in favor of the construction of a cable car slated to be open in May
2013. This analysis explores the dynamics and tensions of urban renewal as it simultaneously operates on the
global and local level in one of the most unequal cities in the world.
Disciplines
Anthropology
This thesis or dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/anthro_seniortheses/143
IN THE SHADOW OF GLORY: 
OLYMPIC PAGEANTRY AND THE DISRUPTION OF RIO’S FAVELAS 
 
 
By 
Elizabeth Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
In  
Anthropology 
 
 
 
Submitted to the  
Department of Anthropology 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
 
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Deborah Thomas 
 
2013 
 ii 
This senior honors thesis explores the changing urban landscape of social inclusion in Rio 
de Janeiro as the city prepares itself for the 2016 Olympics. The study is driven by a 
simple question: who are the winners and losers in hosting the Games? The city is 
undergoing a number of infrastructure projects as it prepares for the Games, capitalizing 
on Olympic preparations but leaving significant populations of the city ignored. 
Combining economic development theory, tourism theory, and displacement theory, I 
focus on the specific case of Morro da Providência, Latin America’s oldest favela, to 
understand the eviction process that 835 families in this community are experiencing in 
favor of the construction of a cable car slated to be open in May 2013. This analysis 
explores the dynamics and tensions of urban renewal as it simultaneously operates on the 
global and local level in one of the most unequal cities in the world.  
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1.1 Research question 
The central question driving this senior honors research is twofold: “Who are the 
Olympics really for?” and “Are the Olympics an effective mechanism for growth in 
developing cities?” The Olympics are framed as a universal celebration of humanity, — 
they “embody all that is best in the human spirit and capture the hearts and minds of 
people around the world” — but in the end, there are winners and losers beyond the 
finish line as well (Rio 2016 Candidature file). Local residents of the host city often see 
few, if any, benefits to hosting the Games, and their lives may be greatly disrupted by the 
cost, crowds and construction caused by the event. The poorest neighborhoods are most 
vulnerable as strict timetables are used to justify top-down policies and limit 
opportunities for community input. This study focuses on the favela residents of Rio de 
Janeiro to explore the experience of one specific group left out of the promises of the 
Olympic dream. This analysis offers powerful insights into the effect of the Olympics on 
marginalized populations and into the structures of inequality that make this exclusion 
possible, even in the context of a left-oriented government that champions pro-poor 
policies.  
1.2 Case selection 
Rio 2016 is a remarkably rich case to study. With a booming economy and a series 
of pro-poor policies in place, in many ways Rio de Janeiro and Brazil as a whole seems 
primed to take off and host a successful Games for the world. But Rio 2016 is a study in 
crippling contrasts: of rich and poor, of rhetoric and reality, and of opportunities and 
missteps. These conflicts stand to undermine the success of the thirty-first Olympiad. 
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Rio de Janeiro —  and Brazil as a whole —  is experiencing incredible economic 
growth. Its booming GDP has replaced the United Kingdom’s as the fifth largest in the 
world. After a brutal military dictatorship and decades of neoliberal economic policies 
that made life increasingly difficult for the poor, Brazil is experiencing a decade of leftism 
geared toward inequality reduction and the growth of the middle class. The first 
Olympics to be held in South America, Rio 2016 is “the attainment of a dream for the 
entire South American continent” (Rio 2016 Candidature file). The Games function as 
“place-promotion”: they put Rio de Janeiro and Brazil on the map as a global city as a hub 
of economic, cultural, athletic and tourist activity. This Olympiad has the potential to 
bring in significant economic revenue and to revitalize poor sectors of society, all the 
while solidifying the development of a cohesive city identity. 
The 2016 Games mark the end of a wave of mega-events that highlights the city’s 
focus on development and international public image. Rio hosted the Pan American 
games in 2007, the Global Military Games in 2011, the Rio+20 UN Conference in 2012, 
and will be hosting the two biggest sporting events in the next three years: the World Cup 
in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016. All of these events — and the Olympic Games in 
particular —  are being framed as an opportunity for economic growth, infrastructure 
development and human rights development for the “entire civil society of Rio,” as the 
city’s mayor, Eduardo Paes noted (Downie 2011).  
But a series of fault lines in Rio de Janeiro make this elusive promise of Olympic 
fixes unattainable. Vast persisting differences in wealth make Rio de Janeiro one of the 
most unequal cities in the world, with a Gini coefficient of .54 (World Bank 2012). The 
inequality in Rio manifests itself in the physical landscape of the city: one in five cariocas 
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lives in favelas, the precarious informal housing settlements located in the hills and 
outskirts of the city. Housing has always been a contentious point of struggle for Rio, and 
because the primary interaction between local host city residents and the Olympic Games 
is through real estate, the case of Rio de Janeiro is especially instructive in understanding 
the processes of Olympic exclusion and inclusion via housing (Shaw 2008). The social 
marginalization of particular demographic groups primes Rio for an inequitable delivery 
of Olympic benefits to its residents and puts precariously housed groups like favelados at 
risk.  
This Olympiad falls in line with a growing pattern of developing nations hosting 
international mega-events. From the 2008 Beijing Olympics to the 2010 Commonwealth 
Games in India to the 2010 World Cup in South Africa and the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, 
developing nations are using mega sports-events to jump start their economies and 
accelerate development. Mega-events are viewed as an opportunity for a quick fix to 
infrastructure problems, but often, underlying issues are not addressed in the rush to 
meet deadlines.   
 The particular case of the Morro da Providência favela highlights many of the 
challenges that Rio faces as an Olympic city. 832 residents face eviction to make way for 
Olympic works, which include a cable car slated to open in Providência in May 2013 
[Table 1; Figure 3]. At 115 years old, Providência is Latin America’s oldest favela, and has 
survived over a century of aggressive favela removal campaigns by the municipal 
government. The displacement of poor favelados in areas like Morro da Providência 
signals the marginalized space that they occupy in society — cast aside and stigmatized, 
they are denied the full rights of their citizenship. The case of Providência illustrates the 
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government’s top-down Olympic urban renewal project, focused on a tourist-centered 
improvement of space rather than a concern for the wellbeing of its citizens. This 
example highlights the conflicting interests of global and local development needs in an 
Olympic city and the acute pressure that the Games put on the preexisting legal and 
physical structures of the municipality. Finally, Providência’s instances of resistance point 
to the complex power dynamics and the various locations of agency in Rio de Janeiro.  
 This paper focuses specifically on the Olympics, rather than the World Cup or the 
other mega events recently hosted in Rio because of the “idealist rhetoric of universal 
peace and international harmony” and the celebration of humanity that the Olympics 
supposedly celebrates (Tomlinson 2006). The disconnect between the rhetoric and its 
application is jarring. The preparations for the 2014 World Cup are nation-wide, in 12 
cities, and are less focused on city-specific development. The 2016 Games are launching 
infrastructure projects in Rio unparalleled by the city’s other mega events, marking the 
Olympics as the most significant mega-event for the future of Rio’s urban planning.  
 Thus, Rio 2016 is a highly instructive case in studying the tensions of hosting a 
mega-event in a developing nation. The unique interplay between rapid economic 
development, mega-event tourism, and marginalized community displacement offers a 
number of compelling intellectual frameworks in which this analysis is based. The very 
benefits that the Games offer — infrastructure development, economic growth, and 
image promotion — also represent the very challenges that may undermine their success.  
1.3 Methodology 
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My goal in writing this thesis is to explore the many different dynamics and 
experiences at play in the preparations for the Games. I drew from a wide variety of 
sources, from case studies of past Olympiads to firsthand accounts of eviction from 
Providência residents and news media coverage. I contrast official governmental files like 
the 2016 Candidature File with findings of human rights groups like the United Nations.  
Because of the currency of this case, I drew heavily on news media, which has 
been crucial to staying up-to-date on the events in Rio. I balanced this approach with a 
strong emphasis on historical Olympic trends and economic and mega-events theory to 
provide some weight and context to the case of Rio de Janeiro.  
Much of this thesis draws on firsthand accounts of the residents in Providência 
facing eviction. Many of their accounts have been recorded on community blogs like 
RioOnWatch, which has acted as a digital open forum for favela residents across the city 
to come together and share their experiences. Whenever possible I used primary sources 
— videos, first-person testimonials, to most accurately capture the experiences of the 
individuals experiencing displacement. Whenever possible, I read the text in the original 
Portuguese, translating words and sentences structures as needed.  
It is important to acknowledge that the availability of information somewhat 
biases the sample available here. Large, information-rich communities like Morro da 
Providência, are more organized and tapped into a larger communications structure than 
smaller communities like the nearby Flor do Asfalto, which has received little coverage of 
the 35 families being evicted. I discuss this bias in greater length in section 5, which 
discuses the methodological limitations of my research. 
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1.4 Definitions  
This thesis understands mega-events to be “major one-time or reoccurring events 
of limited duration, developed primarily to enhance the awareness, appeal and 
profitability of a tourism destination in the short and/or long term” that “rely on their 
success in terms of uniqueness, status, or timely significance to create interest and attract 
attention” (Ritchie 1984:2). This thesis primarily explores the dynamics of sports mega-
events, like the Olympics and the World Cup, but other mega-events, like major 
conferences, can also have a similar pattern of effects on the host city. The Olympics, my 
focus in this paper, are often considered the ultimate mega-event, bringing together all of 
the dynamics together (Figure 5). While this discussion is in part based on the general 
economic and political climate in Rio de Janeiro, my focus in this paper is on the specific 
effects of the Rio 2016 Olympics on the city. 
The other significant element to this work explores the life of favela residents. 
While the specific dynamics of favela life are complex and difficult to generalize, by favela 
I generally mean a shantytown in the hills of Rio de Janeiro where people live in informal 
housing settlements. I discuss the details of favelas in great detail in sections 2.7.1 and 
2.7.3.  
1.5 Thesis overview 
This study first provides context to the different dynamics of the 2016 Games. A 
brief summary of mega-events theory, which focuses on the delivery of outcomes in past 
Olympiads, provides the context to Rio’s approach to the Games as a mechanism for 
economic growth. This is followed by a social, historical and political contextualization of 
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the favelas in Rio society, with a special look at historical trends that are evoked with the 
current conflict.  
The third section discusses the current conflict in Rio between the government 
and the favelas that face eviction. This section incorporates first-hand accounts of the 
evictions, as told by residents. Finally, I discuss the implications of my analysis — what 
can Rio 2016 and the world learn from the experience of evicted favela residents? With a 
growing desire among developing countries to host mega-events, the events leading up to 
Rio 2016 have strong implications for future projects. 
2. Background to the research problem  
2.1 The elusive Olympic legacy  
The Olympics are often hailed as the “Mother Teresa of global events,” a peaceful 
union of elite athletes to “unify the world for 17 glorious days in a celebration of athletic 
perfection” (Shaw 2008:17). The Olympics have led to ceasefires in armed conflicts and 
promote an idea that social transformation can be realized through sport (Toohey 2007). 
Motivations for playing host to an Olympic Games are varied and widespread, but 
the seductive lure of the Olympics has attracted a healthy competition for Olympic host 
in almost every Games since World War II, notes Olympic economist Hølger Preuss 
(2004:83). Cities expect significant economic benefits in a number of categories, including 
expanded tourism, trickle-down growth, infrastructure improvements, increased 
employment and intangible benefits that range from “improved public welfare to 
enhanced international reputation to renewed community spirit” (Magnan 2010: xxviii) 
(Table 5). 
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Winning a bid to play host to an Olympiad is considered a huge honor, a 
transformative decision that validates the host city on the international stage. IOC 
President Jacques Rogge hailed the selection of Beijing as host for the 2008 Games as a 
“new era for China” (Longman 2001). Gianna Angelopoulous, Director of the Athens 
2004 bid, emphasized the transformative aspects of hosting the Games when she said that 
Athens would be a “new city” that would give the world “the Olympics of their dreams” 
(Longman 1997). This mega-events rhetoric extends beyond the Olympics to many 
international sporting events: Thabo Mbeki beamed as he declared that “Africa’s time has 
come” after South Africa was awarded the 2010 World Cup bid (Meldrum 2004).  
This rhetoric and excitement has spilled over to Rio de Janeiro. “Today is the most 
emotional day in my life, the most exciting day of my life,” said then-president Lula da 
Silva when Rio was selected to host the 2016 Games (Macur 2009). “I’ve never felt more 
pride in Brazil. Now, we are going to show the world that we can be a great country.”  
But a deeper evaluation of the delivery of outcomes in past Olympiads reveals a 
mixed bag: economic benefits are often mediocre at best, infrastructure projects often go 
over budget, and real estate prices soar. “The Olympic games are the great circus 
maximus of planet earth,” notes sociologist and Olympic critic Helen Lenskyj (2008). 
The Olympics puts the global orientation of the Games into direct conflict with 
local needs of the host city’s residents. The Olympics can create a hostile political and 
cultural climate in the host city in the months and years leading up to the Games, argues 
anti-Olympic activist Christopher Shaw (2012). The physical landscape is disrupted as 
Olympic construction takes hold and alters the fabric of the city. The glorified framing of 
the Games creates a narrative in which the “overriding goals of the Olympic movement 
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take precedence over petty concerns … the bad things that happen on the local level are 
virtually inconsequential to the overall sweep and majesty of the Olympic experience” 
(Shaw 2008:18). It is often the local residents who end up absorbing the failures of hosting 
the Games, which include debt, unneeded infrastructure, crowding, rent increases, and 
“socially unjust displacement and redistributions” (Shaw 2008:18).   
Local city taxpayers shoulder much of the cost of hosting the Games. For example, 
the initial estimates for the expenditure for London 2012 was ₤1.8 billion, noted at the 
time of the city’s bid for host to the games. By 2007, this number had risen to ₤7.1 billion 
(Magnan 2010:xxvii). The final numbers for the event, hosted just last year, have not been 
released yet. 
The deeper failures of the Games — the long-lasting effects — take five, ten, or 
twenty years to become manifest (Magnan 2010:xxvi). The long-term impacts of the 
Games are under-studied; often attention shifts away from the host city as soon as the 
Olympic Torch is put out, as sports sociologist J. A. Magnan notes. Short-sighted 
evaluation makes it difficult to really understand the transformative effects of the Games: 
the Organizing Committee of an Olympic Games disbands two years after the Games 
end, cutting the 20-year process of analyzing the effects of a Olympiad short (Magnan 
2010:xxix).  
2.2 Place-promotion and global cities  
Much of the excitement of hosting an Olympiad centers around the opportunity 
to introduce or solidify the host city’s “ascendancy and power on the world stage” (Reigel 
2010:17). Mega events are now a “global marketing opportunity” (Tomlinson 2006:5). To 
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ensure a perfect debut or affirmation of the city’s elite global status, the city aims to paint 
a desirable image of a world-class metropolis, a tourist destination, and a utopic urban 
center that runs flawlessly.  
Rio de Janeiro has a chance to prove to the world that it is ready to join the ranks 
of global cities like Barcelona and London, that it can put on a big party like Carnival but 
also host a complex international event like the Games or the World Cup. The Secretary 
of Housing, Pierre Batista, sees the Games as an opportunity to show Rio in a positive 
light: “The Cidade Maravilhosa now has the chance to remove itself from the reputation 
of disorganization and social exclusion that still remains and to become more enchanting 
to the eyes of visitors from throughout the world as well as offering better quality of life 
for all its citizens” (Selvanayagam 2010). A successful Olympics can lead to a virtuous 
cycle of image promotion: “The aura spread by the Olympic image can considerably 
promote the further development of a host city” (Preuss 2004: 290). 
In the preparations to launch a flawless Games, Olympic cities transform into 
what Saskia Sassen has termed global cities. Economic, cultural and political 
powerhouses, global cities are urban centers that transcend national borders and drive the 
global economy while shaping the cultural and political landscape (Sassen 1991). Global 
cities enjoy efficient transportation and telecommunication structures; they have first-
class tourism and cultural complexity (Sassen 1991). They are home to cosmopolitan 
citizens, are easily accessible by international airport and are economically important 
(Sassen 1991). Even host cities like Sochi, host to the 2014 Winter Games, or Salt Lake 
City, 2002 host, temporarily meet these criteria during the two weeks when the whole 
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world is watching (Preuss 2004). This is not to say that all host cities permanently 
transform into global cities, but rather, that they meet these criteria during the Games. 
Host city contenders are often hopeful that the structural improvements carried out for 
the Olympics will leave residual effects.  
2.2.1 Tourism and cultural performance  
Olympic cities are tourist destinations. During the Olympics, host cities attract 
elite visitors as well as the global masses. Past Games have attracted massive crowds to the 
host city for the events: Los Angeles saw 770,000 out-of-city visitors during the 1984 
Games; Atlanta saw 968,000 in 1996 (Preuss 2004). Non-US events are lower: Seoul only 
saw 240,000 tourists in 1988, but Barcelona and Sydney both drew over 450,000 and both 
Athens and Beijing surpassed 660,000 visitors (Preuss 2004).  
A temporary jump in the number of tourists to the host city may bring in 
economic revenue to local businesses but may present long-term challenges to the 
tourism sector. Hotels often over-expand, failing to consider the post-event demand they 
may see, leading to empty beds after being over-capacity for the two weeks between the 
Opening and Closing Ceremonies. The tourist sector also risks losing regular visitors to 
the city who avoid it because of the higher prices and overcrowding during the Games. 
This change in consumption patterns often hurts the regular entertainment and leisure 
industries in the host city (Preuss 2004: 293). Tourism traditionally spikes during the 
Games but then returns to pre-Game levels in the aftermath, suggesting that the 
Olympics have been unsuccessful in permanently reshaping a host city in the eyes of the 
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world and that an Olympic City may only temporarily be described as a global city 
(Preuss 2004). 
There are still, however, intangible benefits to hosting the Games. Place-
promotion can help to internally solidify the group identity of the city and nation. The 
cultural performances put on by the host city, like the Opening Ceremony confers a 
certain level of pride to city residents and the nation as a whole. The opening ceremony of 
the London 2012 Games celebrated the literary heritage of the nation; Beijing 2008 
celebrated the long and complex culture of the nation. In a sense, the Olympics performs 
a nationalistic agenda, bringing together nations of the world in a controlled form of 
warfare —sport — and in doing so it “produces recurrent discourses on national identity” 
(Blanchard 1995; Tomlinson 2006:6).  
But painting a celebratory and homogenous image of the nation can lead to 
marginalizing specific groups and minimizing the diversity of the nation. Contested 
national narratives are not included in the celebratory Opening Ceremonies. London 
2012 did not shed light on the IRA; Beijing 2008 did all it could to cover up the 
allegations of human rights violations in the country (Yardley 2008). Sydney 2000’s 
Ceremony left aboriginal communities invisible, obscuring the darker side of Australia’s 
history (Longman 2000).  
In preparation for the Games, Rio de Janeiro has constructed a number of walls 
separating favelas from the bairros, formalized neighborhoods (Carvalho de Araujo Silva 
2011). This suggests that the narrative of life in the slums, often at odds with the 
government, will not be included in the Opening Ceremony, obscuring the importance of 
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favelas to carioca life. “In a game of visibilities and invisibilities, [the city] seeks to 
redesign representations regarding Rio de Janeiro: touristic city, integrated city and safe 
city” (Carvalho de Araujo Silva 2011). The favelas do not fit into this utopic image. The 
favela evictions that I discuss in great detail below further underline this process of 
rendering favelas invisible.  
2.2.2 Local political atmosphere before and during the Games 
The host city’s efforts to present a tranquil and pleasant city impacts the political 
environment of the region in the lead up to the Games. In some cases, mega-events may 
have positive effects, “prompting otherwise reluctant public officials into carrying out 
much-needed projects for the city” (Zimbalist 2012). But in many cases, Governmental 
efforts to minimize or erase political dissent in the lead up to the Games often leads to 
conflicts (Zimbalist 2012). 
A series of conflicts between residents and the police leading up to the Summer 
2012 Games in London highlighted the city’s “extremely low tolerance for dissent” 
(Qasim 2012). The city enacted the Anti-Social Behavioral Order to prevent any protests 
from erupting in the time leading up to the Games. This Order essentially evolved into a 
state of hyper-surveillance and limited free speech (Walker 2012). 
 Opposition is also being stamped out in Rio de Janeiro in attempts to project an 
image of a tranquil city. A number of protests against Olympics-related construction have 
been shut down by the Unidades Policías Pacificatorias, the police units installed in 
violent neighborhoods (Bahia 2012). One such protest in the Américo Brum Square in 
Morro da Providência was shut down in April 2012 (Bahia 2012). The candidature file 
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obscures this dissent in its emphasis of the support that the city has for hosting the 
Games. “Rio 2016 has the full support of our government and Brazilian society as a 
whole… there is no organized public opposition to hosting the 2016 Olympic and 
Paralympic Games in Rio” (2016 Candidature File).  
The Olympics create a frenzied political climate focused on achieving a specific set 
of goals by a specific deadline for a specific population. This leaves no room for “rational, 
effective long-term planning for the city,” as urban economist Andrew Zimbalist notes 
(2012). The municipal government’s primary focus is on preparing the city for the 
incoming international community, privileging the global over the local. This “focus on 
building the city for the visitor class may strain the bonds of trust between local leaders 
and citizenry” as the civic agenda is skewed away from local interests to the “detriment of 
fundamental municipal services,” notes urbanist Peter Eisinger (2000). This is the tinder 
that can ignite tension between local protestors and the municipal government. Such was 
the case in Vancouver, where the No Games 2010 Coalition protested the city’s ignorance 
of homelessness, poverty, education and health in the city, instead putting on a display of 
bread and circus for the world (Shaw 2008). 
In other cases, like Rio 2016, violations of city residents are more overt, yet 
seemingly justified by the Olympic context. “In a mega event, you basically justify not 
having to enforce human rights or environmental legislation. It is like they have 
suspended basic rights much like a state of emergency due to a war or a catastrophe,” 
notes Raquel Rolnik (2011) special rapporteur to the United Nations on adequate 
housing, who is currently studying the specific case of mega-sports events in Rio de 
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Janeiro. Jorge Bittar, municipal housing secretary, justifies the mass evictions in Rio 
through a seemingly simple logic: “No one is resettled if not for a very important reason,” 
he said (Romero 2012). What the government defines as very important is completely 
divorced from the residents’ perspective.  
2.3 Infrastructure development  
Beneath the intangible effects that place-promotion has on the urban atmosphere 
of a host city lies the hope and excitement that hosting the Games may provide concrete 
benefits — freshly paved roads, improved water and sewage, and more efficient public 
transport — to the host city. Infrastructure preparations for the Olympics can be a 
catalyst for urban renewal. The 2016 Candidature file notes that “for the people of Rio, 
the Games will transform their city with new infrastructure, new environmental, physical 
and social initiatives and new benefits and opportunities for all.”  The idea that the 
Olympics can be a potential catalyst for developing this infrastructure is relatively new: 
early Olympiads were staged in existing spaces like parks and fairgrounds until the 1946 
Tokyo Games (Zimbalist 2012).  
2.3.1 Transportation 
With a significant influx of people to the host city, roads and subways are often 
expanded and fortified in preparation for the incredible volume of visitors to the Games. 
Many host cities experienced transportation improvements in the preparations for the 
Games. In Sydney, bus and urban train systems were dramatically expanded (Lenskyj 
2000). Barcelona constructed the B-20 motorway, a ring road that improved transit in the 
city and was opened just before the 1992 Games (Brunet 1995). Athens improved much 
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of its transportation infrastructure leading up to the 2004 Games by developing a new 
airport, ring road and subway system (Longman 1997).  
 The long-term impacts of these projects, however, are mixed. The Athens subway 
project was incredibly expensive, and the B-20 ring road in Barcelona led to controversial 
population displacement (Preuss 2004). Again, we see the growth is not always inclusive. 
This is a pattern that host cities have seen time and time again: transportation 
infrastructure that is meant to bring people together often proves to be divisive. This 
trend continues in Rio, where the highways that are connecting visitors to the Olympic 
sites in Rio de Janeiro are also creating gashes through neighborhoods and displacing 
poor cariocas who have no place to go (Figure 1).   
 The deadline structure of the Games creates an environment in which the work 
must be done quickly, and the city needs to find the easiest and fastest way to achieve that 
goal. Because many Olympiads host major events in the city center, where space is tight, 
host governments are forced to find the “weakest link,” the path of least resistance to 
getting the most work done as quickly and as cheaply as possible. This helps to explain 
the process by which poor neighborhoods are slighted and the people who live in them 
evicted. This is the case in Rio as well, where the favelados in the centrally located Morro 
da Providência are being displaced to make way for a cable car for tourists.  
2.3.2 Sports Venues 
 Buying into the mantra of “if you build it they will come,” host city governments 
see the construction of sports venues as a keystone of Olympic development. In the eyes 
of politicians, stadiums represent a long-term investment in the economic health of their 
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cities. The construction of huge stadiums to host major events like track and field, as well 
as the Opening and Closing Ceremonies is often costly, but it is an investment that 
governments reason will pay off over time (Magnan 2010).  
 This is very rarely the case, however. Many Olympic stadia fall into disuse after 
the Games, never again attracting the hundreds of thousands of visitors that flocked to 
the Games. These Olympic “white elephants,” as J. A. Magnan describes them, still stand 
in Montreal, Sydney, Athens, Beijing, and an uncertain future awaits the 80,000-seat 
Olympic Stadium in London (Macur 2013). This Olympic overbuilding has left cities in 
debt, and can become an embarrassing physical symbol of a costly and problem-riddled 
Games. Further, stadium upkeep can continue to be a financial drain: The Athens 
stadiums, for example, cost the municipal government €100 million to maintain annually, 
despite rarely being used (Lyall 2013).  
The construction of these sports venues is focused around tourism-centered 
development, focusing on attracting external revenues rather than developing the local 
economy. Olympic stadia rarely, if ever, address the needs of the local population or serve 
any functional purpose in the day-to-day workings of the city. Further, the funds spent on 
building the stadium could have been spent on other services to actually benefit the 
citizenry.  
 Eisinger (2000) argues that tourism-focused policies are a modern-day version of 
bread and circus. The redirecting of public funds to stadiums, convention centers or 
casinos, rather than schools, public housing or healthcare indicates that the municipal 
agenda is geared towards the betterment of visiting elites. It is a policy that favors 
constructing “stadiums for millionaires and tourists rather than schoolrooms for poor 
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children,” Eisinger argues (328). Stadia fall into disuse because the demand cannot be 
sustained by the permanent needs of local residents. The “projected spending and 
spillover benefits” of regional impact models never materialize (Porter 1999:61).  
 The most successful host cities seem to be those that construct few new stadiums, 
freeing up infrastructure funds to be spent on long-lasting benefits to the city. Barcelona 
only spent 9.1 percent of its total Olympic budget on constructing new venues, allowing 
for less sports arena investment and more money spent on infrastructure improvements 
to benefit city residents like new roads and sewage systems (Brunet 1995).  
In this respect, Rio 2016’s prospects are promising. It has many preexisting stadia 
from earlier mega-events and is investing relatively little in venue construction. The 
budget included in the Candidature File allocates only US$490,250 to sports venue 
construction. In contrast, it allots significantly more for lasting infrastructure: US$ in 
2008 4,451,487 in transportation and US$770,000 in power and electricity (Candidature 
File:127). 
2.3.3 Housing 
“The Olympic Games at the local level are all about real estate,” notes anti-Games 
activist Christopher Shaw (2008), who organized the No Games 2010 protest in 
Vancouver. Local residents are most impacted by the Games through the long-term 
impact it has on their homes.  
Both tangible and intangible displacements — eviction and gentrification/rising 
housing prices — have forced millions of people out of their homes in preparation or as a 
result of Olympic Games. 720,000 Seoul residents were evicted in 1988. 30,000 people 
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were displaced in Atlanta in 1996, and 9,000 of the city’s homeless were arrested in an 
effort to “clean up the streets” in preparation for the Games (COHRE). 1.5 million people 
were displaced in preparation for Beijing 2008 (COHRE). A network of Brazilian activists 
from across the country estimate that 170,000 people will be evicted from their homes in 
preparation for the 2014 Cup and the 2016 Games (Romero 2012). 
Coupled with forced evictions from homes is a second process of intangible 
displacement via gentrification. Promises of affordable housing have been a constant 
feature of recent Olympic bids but have failed to materialize in almost all post-Games 
cities and are instead replaced with rising real estate prices in poor neighborhoods. Cox 
et. al (1994) argues that “the experience of previous host cities for the Games indicates 
that the Olympic Games have usually contributed significantly to the worsening of 
housing affordability and access for low-income people” (45).  
Even in cities generally considered a success, like Barcelona, we see rising housing 
prices extending across the whole city, “making housing accessibility quite difficult for the 
local population” (Lenskyj 2008:27). The average Barcelona family needed to dedicate 
more than 54 percent of its annual income to pay rent or mortgage in the years following 
the Games. This says nothing of poorer populations, who have actually moved out of the 
city in large part (Lenskyj 2008). The East End of London is currently experiencing 
gentrification as a product of the Games being hosted there last summer, and emerging 
evidence suggests that Morro da Providência is observing a spike in real estate prices as 
Olympic construction continues there (Colbert 2012).  
Preuss (2004) argues, however, that the real-estate speculation that occurs in 
Olympic cities after the Games may be connected to national economic trends, rather 
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than directly linked to hosting the Games. To link rising housing prices with the Olympic 
Games, argues Preuss, there must be a demonstration of a redirecting of funds for “social 
housing schemes to erect the Olympic Village and that less apartments were created than 
would have been possible through alternative housing projects costing the same amount 
of money” (263). He notes that there is little data to support this theory. 
Taking Preuss’s critique into account, it becomes even more evident that the rise 
in housing prices in Morro da Providência is a result of Olympic works. The rise in 
commercial real estate in Providência is currently growing at twice the rate of the rest of 
the city (Barbosa 2013). Providência’s real estate speculation cannot be linked to larger 
national trends: where Brazil has seen an annual GDP growth of over four percent for 
more than a decade, the spike in real estate prices in Providência can be traced to 2010, 
when the Olympic works started in the neighborhood (Colbert 2012).  
2.3.4 Improvements to urban ecology 
Rising real estate prices may also be linked to the general atmospheric 
improvements in the urban ecology. The tangible infrastructure improvements may 
translate into a revival of the urban life of a city through the interplay of the built 
environment and the lived experience of residents.  
With new sports venues, parks, leisure time recreation areas, improved 
transportation, and housing, the city stands to see a cultural revitalization through an 
improvement in the quality of public space (Preuss 2004:94). Olympic cities are nice 
places to be. Atlanta, host of the 1996 Games, invested more than US$71.7 million into 
“city atmosphere” in preparation for the Games, and the effects of this continue today 
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(Preuss 2004:92).  The 2016 Candidature File allocates US$ for 820,206 in “urban legacy 
investments” for Rio de Janeiro. (Candidature File:126).  
 But these benefits are also not equally experienced across all sectors of society. It is 
not inclusive growth: often only the elites benefit from these changes. Only the citizens 
with “money to spend” benefit from the physical improvements to the city; “the 
impoverished sector of the population gain little benefit if leisure time quality is improved 
by attractive follow-up events or if living is improved by offering expensive housing near 
the city centre in a nice city atmosphere” (Preuss 2004:93). With neither the time nor the 
resources to spend on additional leisure time, the poor do not see the benefits of these 
ecological improvements.  
2.4 The Olympics as a mechanism for economic growth  
Economic development has increasingly become a significant motivator in 
hosting the Olympics. Short-term benefits — direct revenue generated from commerce 
and tourism — are coupled with long-term goals sought through lasting touristic and 
trade effects.  
Examples like Los Angeles and Barcelona, where investments were low and 
returns were high, make bidding cities hopeful. Los Angeles 1984 brought in an 
incredible surplus of US$200 million, making it by far the most financially successful host 
city in terms of directly generated revenue because it attracted corporate sponsors 
(Abrahamson 2001). Barcelona, host of the 1992 Games, is often lauded as the poster 
child for an Olympiad with long-lasting economic benefits (Brunet 1995:8). It spurred 
significant infrastructure development in the region, created over 20,000 permanent jobs, 
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ignited a four-year construction boom, and helped to reverse economic stagnation in the 
region (Brunet 1995). The Games transformed the city and helped reshape its global 
image.  
Sydney pursued a number of innovative economic growth models during and 
after the 2000 Games. The “consumption-based economic development” model described 
by Adranovich et al (2001) was successful in Sydney as local business boomed (116). 
New South Wales hotels, restaurants, bars and retail saw incredible revenues — over 
US$727 million (Preuss 2004:274). The Sydney municipal government also aggressively 
courted foreign investors in the aftermath of the Games through its “Investment 2000” 
program, which resulted in US$85.7 million to New South Wales and 1,219 new jobs in 
the region (Preuss 2004: 274).  
Los Angeles and Barcelona, however, are the exceptions, not the rule. Most host 
cities in the last half century have overestimated the positive impact that hosting the 
Games could have on their economy — many, like Montreal 1976 and Athens 2004 are 
left in significant debt after playing host (Preuss 2004:175). Montreal’s US$1.5 billion in 
debt took 30 years to pay off; Athens was left with a public sector debt of five percent of 
GDP (Bray 2011:100). The Athens government paid for nearly 80 percent of the Olympic 
budget for the 2004 Games, and only 15 percent of the total budget was spent on 
infrastructure (Preuss 2004:176).  
Summer Games since the millennium have brought in between US$5 —$6 billion 
in total revenue, with nearly half of this income siphoned off to the International Olympic 
Committee (Zimbalist 2012). In contrast, expenditures have risen to exorbitant amounts: 
US$16 billion in Athens, US$40 billion in Beijing, and an estimate of almost US$20 
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billion in London (Zimbalist 2012). Only some of this spending went toward long-term 
infrastructure projects that continued to have positive benefits after the Closing 
Ceremony. Further, long-term benefits of hosting the Games are not realized as demand 
for Olympic services and infrastructure is reduced over time (Preuss 2004).  
The Rio de Janeiro municipal government estimates that with hosting the Games 
will come 50,000 temporary and 15,000 permanent jobs in construction, retail and 
tourism — with job training for 48,000 residents — and more than 24,000 new homes for 
residents after the Olympic Village is vacated (Candidature file). The city’s hope is that 
the economic surplus will free up money for other social programs.  
City Mayor Eduardo Paes, echoes this sentiment, emphasizing the social 
improvements the Games, and the city’s series of mega-events will have for the city: 
“Within a short time, the city will be the base of a number of international events that will 
mark its future history… with these scenarios, we want the city to continue moving up 
the reference scale of the Human Development Index (HDI) in terms of quality of life and 
social inclusion. The opportunity is now, and I believe it is something that we may not 
have again” (Selvanayagam 2010). 
2.5 Specific challenges to host cities in the Global South 
The Olympics offers an elusive dream to all hosts, but the unique set of 
opportunities and challenges that it presents to cities in developing nations requires 
special attention. More and more developing nations are hosting mega-events, like the 
Beijing 2008 Olympics, the 2010 South Africa World Cup, and the upcoming World Cups 
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in Russia (2018) and Qatar (2022). The benefits of playing host in the specific context of 
developing countries, however, remain unclear.  
Mega events offer developing cities a chance for accelerated economic and 
infrastructure development, a way to jumpstart the country’s fiscal and physical growth. 
The Games may act as a catalyst to speed up municipal and state decision-making, 
overcoming political gridlocks and recalcitrant politicians and “impelling the city to 
finally do what was long overdue,” argues Zimbalist (2012). Such was the case with 
Athens’ transportation and construction updates. The highly public image of the 
Olympics may also put positive pressure on politicians to improve their human rights and 
environmental record, as was observed in the lead-up to the 2008 Beijing Games 
(Longman 2001).  
These short-term benefits, however, may be premature or superficial. The 
international media attention might lead a host nation to push problems further under 
the table, acknowledging that there is a problem but feeling that there is not enough time 
to adequately address the root issues before the Opening Ceremony. Any infrastructure 
investments that come to a host nation are often linked to greater investments in 
stadiums and general preparations for the bid and staging of the mega-event (Lenskyj 
2008).  
International sporting event organizers like FIFA and the International Olympic 
Committee are not focused on developing economies but rather are for-profit groups 
with the primary aim to generate revenue and promote international athletics. The 
technical requirements of the IOC and FIFA are consistent across the board and do not 
consider the additional cost of compliance for nations with more work to do in meeting 
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the IOC standards (Alegi 2009, 398). South Korea spent US$2 billion on new stadiums in 
preparation for the 2002 World Cup while Germany, only four years later, spent only 
US$700 million because of the preexisting infrastructure it had in place (Alegi 2009:398).  
In all cases, the justification of Olympic expenditures must be considered in the 
larger context of the host city’s economy. Baade and Matheson (2003) argue that with this 
view it is painfully clear that the opportunity cost to hosting the Games is exorbitantly 
higher in developing nations (15). The US$15 billion that the Chinese spent in Beijing in 
2008 could have arguably been better spent on healthcare, environmental concerns, 
education and housing in the region (Zimbalist 2012). While the same arguments could 
be applied to the US$15 billion that London spent in 2012, the pressing need for this 
funding is much lower in London, where the standard of living is on average much higher 
and more people have more access to higher quality healthcare and education.  
The case of the 15th Pan American Games, which took place in Rio in 2007, 
highlights the tensions of hosting a mega-event in a developing BRIC nation. The Pan 
American Games were the first mega-event hosted in Brazil in 44 years, meaning that 
costly investments in sports venues were needed, leaving the city with significant debt 
(Curi et al 2011). The 2007 candidature bid offered empty promises for a legacy of 
transportation improvements, investment in social projects and public security, economic 
stimulation and a far-reaching urban transformation — these promises were not realized 
(Curi et al. 2011). 
2.6 Political and economic growth in Brazil 
 26 
Dilma Rousseff’s presidential election in the fall of 2010 cements a decade of leftist 
shift in Brazilian politics (Pomar 2011). Lula da Silva’s two-term presidency, which 
started in 2003, was marked primarily by a leftist social agenda that expanded the political 
arena to include the poor (Sader 2009). His social programs, like the Bolsa Familia 
conditional cash transfer program, tackle issues like hunger, education, poverty and 
inequality that face the urban and rural poor. (Bohn 2011). During his tenure 20 million 
people rose out of acute poverty and inequality dropped 5.5 percent (The Daily Beast). 
The passing of the torch to Rousseff, Lula’s chief of staff, marks a continuity in this leftist 
agenda (Pomar 2011).  
Brazil’s decade of leftism is in line with a larger shift to the left in Latin American 
politics — Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela have popularly elected 
leftist leaders as well — as a rejection of the neoliberal economic policies espoused by 
many of the military dictatorships of the 1980’s (Paramio 2006). The pro-business 
approach of economic neoliberalism — the privatization of public banks and companies, 
the attraction of speculative capital, and the retraction of social functions of the state — 
lead to a “deterioration of the legitimacy of the state,” emphasizing a system that 
sustained the accumulation of capital over the collective needs of its citizenry to the 
detriment of the poor (Sader 2009:28; Harvey 2003:940). Latin America’s 21st century 
leaders are working to rebuild the state delivery of social services and refashion the 
government and economy to serve the people. Hugo Chavez’s death in March 2013 may 
represent a complication to the Venezuelan left, though his leftist Vice President and 
interim successor Nicolas Maduro has been consistently leading in the polls leading up to 
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the April 14 election, suggesting a continuity in Chavez’s leftist politics (Hinterlaces Poll 
2013).  
While da Silva’s and Rousseff’s tenures have focused in large part on remedying 
the social problems developed under neoliberalism, it has not entirely abandoned 
neoliberalism as an economic model (Sader 2009). Where Argentina and Bolivia, among 
others, re-nationalized key companies and banks, Brazil has left companies privatized, 
interest rates high, and a highly global trade network in place (Sader 209).  
The Brazilian economy has expanded at an unprecedented rate during the last 
decade, with about a four percent average annual GDP growth (Rhode 2012). In 2010 it 
grew a remarkable 7.5 percent and in 2012, it overtook the United Kingdom as the fifth 
largest economy in the world, valued at US$ 2.52 trillion (Mozée 2012). In 2012 it also 
lent nearly US$ 10 billion to the IMF in response to the Eurozone crisis, solidifying its 
geoeconomic ascendency (Winnett 2012). The economy is complex and diverse: major 
industries include mining, banking, oil and gas, hydroelectric energy, as well as 
automobile manufacturing, steel production and technology (Forbes 2008). 
The middle class has expanded significantly over this period — the Getulio Vargas 
Institute approximates that 33 million people entered this economic bracket under Lula 
da Silva’s tenure (Cortes Neri 2009). Now about 106 million Brazilians out of a 
population of 190 million fall into this economic bracket (The Daily Beast).  
But this promising boom has its limits: Brazil’s economic growth has not proven 
to be inclusive — Brazil remains one of the most unequal countries in the world. With 
Gini coefficient of .54, it is more unequal than the other BRIC countries (World Bank 
2012).  2010 census data reveals that half of the Brazilian population continues to live on 
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less than R$373/month (~US$180), significantly less than the R$510 minimum wage in 
2010 (Leahy 2011). As the middle class expanded, tens of millions of people missed out 
on the opportunities presented under da Silva and Rousseff.  
Growth does not directly translate to poverty reduction, and can in fact exacerbate 
inequality, as Jeffrey Sachs argues in his 2005 work The End of Poverty. Urban sociologist 
Loïc Wacquant supports this view, arguing that social inequality “persists and deepens 
within a context of overall economic prosperity” in contexts of advanced marginality and 
structural inequality (Perlman 2010:158).  
Da Silva’s and Rousseff’s social policies have not succeeded in equally distributing 
the wealth among the classes. We can see the limited benefits for economic growth in the 
persisting inequality in Rio de Janeiro, where an unequal distribution of assets, including 
property, is preventing inclusive growth.  
2.7 The favelas of Rio de Janeiro 
Inequality in Rio de Janeiro manifests itself in the physical landscape of the city, 
whereas poor favelados live separate lives from the rich cariocas with beachfront 
properties. The favelas are often viewed as stigmatized spaces, populated by people living 
on the social margins, despite the physical centrality of many favelas in the city. Urban 
anthropologist Janice Perlman contests this view, however, arguing that favelas are 
central to the social fabric of quotidian carioca life (1976). Favelas may offer physical 
proximity to the urban center but they remain on the periphery of the political priorities 
of the state.  
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Rio’s is the largest favela population in Brazil. It is disproportionately populous: it 
represents a quarter of the national favela population despite the fact that Rio only 
accounts for three percent of the total Brazilian population (Perlman 1976). 700 favelas 
pepper the city in total (Tusia 2012); of the 5,857,904 Cariocas living in Rio de Janeiro at 
the time of the 2000 Census, 1,092,476 were officially living in favelas (Perlman 2010:52). 
This is 18.7 percent of the carioca population, though it is difficult to measure an official 
number of residents in informal housing. Rio’s favelados have outpaced the general 
growth of Rio’s population every in every decade since 1950 except the 1970’s, when 
100,000 favela residents were evicted under the military dictatorship regime (Perlman 
2010:53). Rio’s favelas grew by 6.5 percent in the second half of the 20th century; the city 
grew by 2.5 percent in the same time period (Perlman 2010:53). This data strongly 
supports the view that favela residents are significant to Rio de Janeiro’s culture, economy 
and society and should not be victimized by the government.  
2.7.1 Definitions  
 Infrastructure in Rio’s favelas ranges from communities with dirt roads and 
makeshift shacks constructed with plastic, wood and scrap metal to neighborhoods with 
electricity, paved roads, running water and apartments with multiple floors (Tusia 2012). 
Many of these homes were built by the residents, anthropologist James Holston notes in 
his analysis of informal settlement patterns in Brazil (Holston 1991a). The official 
definition of a favela, as defined by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, is a 
“settlement of 50 housing units or more located on public or private property and 
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characterized by disordered occupation without the benefit of essential public services” 
(Perlman 2010:59).  
 The government’s narrow definition, however, overlooks a significant portion of 
the population — favela population estimates range from one million to four million 
(Perlman 2010). This discrepancy can be accounted for by a broader definition of 
informal housing — one that includes both conjuntos and loteamientos in the official 
approximations. Data from the 2000 Brazilian census shows that 37 percept of Rio’s 
population was living in informal housing, with favela residents making up 18.7 percent 
of that population (Perlman 2010). Another 12 percent lives in conjuntos while the 
remaining six percent of informal residents live in loteamientos (Perlman 2010). A 
loteamiento is a clandestine, quasi-legal residence in the hillside, while a conjunto is a 
type of public housing with little governmental involvement — a poorly maintained 
apartment building rife with violence and overcrowded with poor residents (Perlman 
2010.  
A fourth group of peripheral residents is the homeless, who are often ignored 
entirely from the study of marginal housing in Rio de Janeiro. While little data exists on 
the percentage of homeless cariocas, Brazil’s Economic Research Institute Foundation 
estimated in 2003 that 2,500 cariocas were homeless. People living in all of these 
settlement patterns are being displaced by Olympic works. 
2.7.2 History  
 The Olympic favela removal evokes a long and tumultuous history between the 
municipal government and favelados that dates back over a century. To understand the 
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current evictions, we must understand the context in which the favelas evolved in relation 
to the government and its larger view for Rio’s 20th century urban planning. Because one 
of the basic assumptions in property rights is the idea that “historical precedent confers 
legitimacy,” it is important to understand the history and root of the favelas in Rio de 
Janeiro to understand the context in which people chose and were forced to settle there 
(Holston 1991b: 697).  
Rio’s favelas arose amid the abolition of slavery and an aggressive urban renewal 
and removal project. The end of slavery in 1888 resulted in a housing shortage in many of 
Brazil’s urban centers as ex-slaves flocked to cities looking for work (Brandão 2006). This 
housing shortage forced ex-slaves into unhygienic tenements in the city center, much to 
the chagrin of the city’s then-mayor, Pereria Passos (Brandão 2006).  
Passos began a significant urban renewal project to simultaneously clear the city 
of this illiterate class of poor ex-slaves and to model Rio after the great European cities. 
The parallels between the current preparations for the Olympics and this effort to 
“express Rio’s increasing importance on the international scene” and to “elevate it to the 
same level of other important international cities” and are unmistakable (Brandão 
2006:39).  
The city beautification process was closely modeled off Baron Haussmann’s work 
in Paris 30 years prior. Passos’s administration, with support from the federal 
government, tore down numerous tenements to construct stately buildings in the 
European architectural style and to build wide avenues modeled on the Champs-Elysées 
(Brandão 2006:42). The Thêatro Municipal was inspired by the Paris Opera House, and 
the Avenida Rio Branco are products of this public works effort.   
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More than 3,000 tenement homes were destroyed during Passos’s tenure, forcing 
the poor out of their homes and into the hills. A small settlement of soldiers had 
established themselves in what is now Morro da Providência in 1897, waiting for land 
promised by the government as payment for their military service (Perlman 1976). Many 
of the evicted ex-slaves joined the soldiers in Providência, solidifying the area as a 
housing settlement (Brandão 2006). One thousand residents from the Cabeça do Porco 
tenement were evicted and moved to Morro da Providência (Perlman 1976:76). Other 
favelas like Mangueira popped up in the hillsides in the years following as the government 
continued to create a hostile and inhospitable environment to poor cariocas (Perlman 
1976:79). 
Favelas emerged as a product of state-produced poverty and from a paradoxical 
combination of governmental aggression and indifference. The basis of the favelas in the 
hills is twofold. First, hillside homes offered proximity to the workplace in the Zona Sul 
(Southern Zone). Second, falling just outside the city limits, settlement in the hills did not 
violate the Rio de Janeiro Civil Code of Public Works, which forbade the building of 
unauthorized homes or improvement of preexisting building structures within the city 
limits (Pino 1997b:41).   
Favela-governmental relations have remained antagonistic since their inception, 
with the main goal of the government consistently being favela removal. Favelas were first 
officially recognized by the Rio government in 1937 when the municipal building code 
declared them illegal (Frisch 2012). Direct favela removal campaigns began in the 1950’s 
and continued more aggressively through the 1970’s (Fischer 2008). Though a 1956 law 
banned the eviction of favela residents, the military dictatorship that ruled from 1964 to 
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1985 ignored that law and was especially forceful in legislating new favela removal 
policies (Fischer 2008).   
By the end of the 1970’s, it is estimated that the dictatorship had relocated over 
100,000 favela residents, exacerbating their already precarious financial positions and 
disrupting communities (Perlman 2010). Many residents of favelas in the Zona Sul, near 
the city center, were relocated to far-off shantytowns in the Zona Oeste (Western Zone) 
where they had to pay a significantly higher price to commute to work near their former 
homes in the Zona Sul (Tusia 2012). The favela population dropped significantly in this 
period, only to rise again in the 1980’s and 1990’s, with drug lords regulating social order 
in the void left by the government (Tusia 2012:14). In 1982, the government cut a deal 
with the drug lords that prohibited the police from entering the favelas, depriving 
favelados of state protection as drug-related violence raged (Perlman 2010:175). 
More recently, programs have shifted from slum removal to efforts to control and 
contain the individuals in the favelas (Tusia 2012:17). The discourse has shifted from 
spatial removal to a control over bodies of the poor. However, as I argue below, the recent 
razing programs by the government in preparation for the Olympics is much more in line 
with earlier programs of slum removal. 
Economic shifts have contributed to favela growth. In booms, migrants flock to 
the city seeking jobs (Pino 1997b). For example, Rio’s favelas exploded in the 1940’s 
under Getulio Vargas’s urban industrialization programs — part of the larger Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI) economic model of the time — that attracted 
hundreds of thousands of poor rural migrants to the city (Pino 1997b). Most settled in the 
favelas as they looked for work. Once they arrived in Rio, however, many struggled to 
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find industrial jobs and instead found work in the formal and informal service sectors 
(Tusia 2012).Rio’s favela population nearly tripled during the 1960’s, at the peak of the ISI 
model (Pino 1997b:159). 
Favelas also grow in a contracting economy. As the military dictatorship moved in 
and shifted away from ISI economics to neoliberalism, the public sector and service sector 
jobs that employed poor migrants in the 1960’s were the hardest hit by the economic shift 
to privatization (Tusia 2012:117). With a contracting of the welfare state’s safety net, 
many of these unemployed migrants who were not previously living in the favelas moved 
in, unable to afford rents elsewhere.  
It is important to understand the economic and political forces that pushed the 
poor into the favelas. It was not an idle choice by lazy people unwilling to pay for housing 
but rather it was “historically contingent upon the workings of larger, structural forces 
and of changes in the global economy,” as anthropologist Tusia Tomi notes (2012). 
Economist Hernando de Soto (2000) echoes this point: “The migrants became extralegals 
to survive: They stepped outside the law because they were not allowed inside,” (87).  The 
inconsistent ebbs and flows of aggressive removal policies were highly disruptive —
 residents moved in during peaceful periods, only to be forced out by later governmental 
aggression.  
2.7.3 Opportunity structures and quality of life in Rio’s favelas  
 This brief history of favelas in Rio de Janeiro illustrates favela development was 
primarily the result of governmental forces, rather than in the hands of favela residents. 
What implications does this have for the agency that favelados have over their own lives? 
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Do they enjoy the same level of social and economic mobility as non-favela residents? 
 Wage inequality between favela residents and bairro residents is stark. Janice 
Perlman, an urban anthropologist who has studied Rio’s favelas since the 1970’s, found 
that in the South Zone, the most unequal area of the city, non-favela residents earned 566 
percent more monthly than favela residents, according to 2010 census data (Perlman 
2010:58). Favela residents have little access to healthcare or waste management and report 
being underfed at a higher rate than the city’s general population (Perlman 2010: 158). 
On average, favelados report higher rates of unemployment, are less educated, have less 
access to social services, and live in more crowded houses (Perlman 2010:159). 
 Education in favelas offers fewer opportunities to students than schools in the 
asfalto, the formal urban grid. “Being in a favela means having teachers who are not as 
good as the ones who teach in bairros and who only show up 2-3 times a week; having less 
social support for staying in school; being in a crowded (usually noisy) home with the 
television on and no room to study or for privacy” (Perlman 2010:236). Non-favela 
residents earn about twice as much as favela residents where both groups have completed 
high school (Perlman 2010:238).  
 Further, much of the favelados’ wealth is invested in their homes. There is a low 
return on investment because the houses are in the informal market, reducing their 
capacity for residential mobility. Homes in the favelas “are not integrated into the formal 
property system and as a result are not fungible and adaptable to most transactions” (De 
Soto 2000:87).  This economic pressure keeps favelados in favelas.  
But favelas are not necessarily concentrated areas of poverty where all residents 
have no opportunity for upward social mobility. Not all poor people live in favelasi, and 
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not all people who live in favelas are necessarily poor. This is a crucial detail to note in 
understanding the current evictions in Rio — it is the intersection of precarious housing 
and low socioeconomic status that makes the evictions in Rio such a significant challenge 
to the urban poor. Favelas lead to a combination of economic and political 
discrimination, mediated through property laws and the economic valuation of property 
that leads to a strong correlation between poverty and favela residence. But this 
connection does not hold true in all cases. The favelas are in many ways a symbol, a 
tangible space, for poverty in Rio, but this heuristic device has its shortcomings.   
Janice Perlman’s findings suggest that favelas may be a temporary housing option 
for some residents — that they move freely in and out of the hills. She observed a 
relatively high degree of residential mobility when surveying the current occupancy 
patterns of the favela residents she had interviewed 30 years ago. About as many of them 
continued to live in favelas 30 years later as had moved to bairros, or formal legal 
neighborhoods. Further, the grandchildren of the original occupants lived in legal 
neighborhoods at almost twice the rate as those who continued to live in favelas (Perlman 
2010:337). Considering the relative ease of expanding auto-constructed houses to absorb 
the spatial demands of a growing family, this statistic is strongly indicative of the outward 
mobility opportunities available in favelas.  
There is also a growing trend of gentrification currently happening in some of the 
more centrally located favelas, indicating two-way mobility (Santos Olivera 1996). Race 
does not seem to be a strong indicator of social mobility in favelas: Perlman did not find 
any correlation between being light skinned and having the social mobility to leave 
favelas at higher rates (156). 
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But many other favelados choose to stay, despite having the financial or social 
capital to move away. They cite strong social ties and attachment to their home as 
primary factors in their decision. Members of community organizations invest time and 
energy into community work, becoming deeply rooted in their community and 
expressing a reluctance to leave, even if they have the financial agency (Perlman 2010).  
This analysis of residential mobility speaks to the varied levels of agency over 
residential patterns among favela residents. One constant, however, is the adverse effects 
of favela removal for all residents, who are denied agency over their lives when the 
government launches a removal campaign. Favelados who are too poor to move are 
adversely affected from the displacement, left with no home and not enough funds to 
relocate elsewhere. Those who want to stay are deprived of the positive social benefits of 
favelas when they are forced out. Favela displacement deeply disrupts the social fabric of 
the community and any compensation home owners might receive from the government 
would not mirror the investment they made in the land. We see all of these dynamics at 
play in the Olympic removals taking place in Morro da Providência.  
2.7.4 Perceptions/Representations of favelados  
 Corollary to an examination of economic mobility in favelas is an examination of 
social and spatial mobility. Understanding the social space that favelados occupy in 
carioca society is crucial to understanding the present-day processes of favela removal.  
Eighty-three percent of favela residents in 2001 said that they believed their 
residence in a favela to be a major source of discrimination in their lives (Perlman 
2010:154). Race is also perceived as a factor of discrimination among favelados: Perlman’s 
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recent study revealed that 80 percent of older favelados, who have lived there for over 30 
years, perceive skin color to be a basis of stigma (155).  
The discourse surrounding favelas often refers to them as Rio’s primary urban 
problem. Latin American scholar Daniel Goldstein (2004) suggests that poor people in 
Latin American cities are treated as “marginals,” and are viewed as “backward, aggressive, 
and uncivilized in nature, qualities that their geographical position on the urban 
periphery reflects” (12).  
The city walled off favelas during the 2007 Pan American Games and began a 
similar process in 2009 around favelas in the Zona Sul in preparation for the Olympics 
and World Cup (Tusia 2012). The walling of favelas marks an effort by the municipal 
government to create “islands of excellence to be shown on television, thus hiding the 
unsightly parts of the city: the poor neighborhoods and favelas” (Curi et al. 2011). Teresa 
Caldeira (1996) argues that this erection of physical boundaries amplifies inequality as it 
“creates environments that generate the sense that different groups belong to separate 
universes and have irreconcilable claims… cities of walls do not strengthen citizenship 
but rather contribute to its corrosion” (317). 
Janice Perlman powerfully disputes this classical conception of favelas as 
marginalized spaces. In her seminal 1976 work The Myth of Marginality and again in her 
recent 2010 book simply titled Favela, she argues that favelados are in fact “not marginal 
at all but inextricably bound into society, albeit in a manner detrimental to their own 
interests” (Perlman 2010:150). They play an integral role in the economic and political 
realms of carioca life, but they are “exploited, manipulated and repressed… although they 
are neither socially nor culturally marginal, they are stigmatized and excluded from a 
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closed class system” (Perlman 2010:150). Economist Hernando de Soto estimates that the 
extralegal sector accounts for up to two-thirds of the total economic output in Latin 
America (85).  
Perlman argues that the discourse surrounding favelas in many ways shapes the 
perception and reality of the hillside homes. Drawing on the Foucauldian conception of 
discourse as a system of ideological thoughts that construct the worlds which they 
describe, this image of a dangerous, crime-ridden area with lazy and uneducated residents 
perpetuates the stigma surrounding the space and shapes the interactions residents have 
with civil society and the government (Foucault 1972:25). “The power of the ideology and 
discourse of marginality was so great that it became self-fulfilling, justifying favela 
removal and perversely creating precisely the disaffection and disconnection that was 
professed to be a danger to the stable social order in the first place” (Perlman 2010:150).  
In highlighting the central role that they play in shaping carioca culture and 
society, Perlman is reframing the discourse surrounding favelados to one that 
acknowledges their function and utility in society. This view, one that emphasizes the 
cultural and economic contributions of favelados — from soccer, slang and samba to 
consuming products at inflated prices and taking on the worst jobs for the lowest pay — 
asserts the importance and value of favelados to Rio society. 
This perspective is what the municipal government must consider before razing 
favela communities across the city in preparation for the mega-events of the World Cup 
in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016. “Insofar as the favela residents are seen as “social 
problems” the idea of getting rid of them will never be off the policy table” (Perlman 
2010:148).  
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Favelas like Morro da Providência have made historical and contemporary 
contributions to the culture that defines life in Rio de Janeiro. “Providência is part of one 
of the most important cultural sites in Afro-Brazilian history, where the first commercial 
sambas were composed and traditions like capoeira and candomblé flourished,” notes the 
Providência Residents Commission (2012).  
Contemporary favela culture is also flourishing. Electronic music is thriving in the 
downtown favela of Lapa, which hosted its second annual Rio Funk Parade in November 
2012 (Vitali 2013). The Carioca Design Center recently hosted an exhibition of 125 pieces 
of modern art designed by residents from 15 favelas (UPP Social 2012).  
In Morro da Providência, cultural organizations are thriving. Mauricio Hora, a 
photographer who grew up in Providência, founded Favelarte, an educational, cultural 
and entertainment organization with a focus on improving the quality of life in 
Providência (Williamson and Hora 2012). Providência residents also organized a haute 
cuisine food festival and competition last November, bringing together the specific 
cuisines of various favelas in the city (Clarke 2012).  
2.7.5 The location of political power and agency in favelas 
In the absence of an active government working to provide public services to its 
citizens, favelados have a long history of providing for themselves. What started as 
Residents’ Associations that provided services like street paving, electricity and water has 
evolved into more focused political organizations centered on demanding rights and 
services.  
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Residents’ Associations were thrust into the political sphere as concerted favela 
removal programs surged in the 1970’s. Groups mobilized around “government inaction 
or hostile displacement programs led jointly by government and real estate interests,” 
notes sociologist Michel Fontaine (1985:65). As eviction efforts slowly waned, resistance 
organizations shifted their focus to the political arena, with an aim to “secure community 
stability and obtain basic infrastructure” (Fontaine 1985: 61). This “emergence of new 
participatory publics expanded substantive citizenship to new social bases” as they 
searched for channels to access political power (Holston 2011). They found allies on the 
peripheries of the formal sector: in opposition politicians, radical journalists and 
charitable organizations (Holston 2011). The Federation of Residents’ Associations of the 
State of Rio de Janeiro demanded fundamental urban services from the government and 
was particularly adept at influencing candidates for City Council Positions, until the mid-
1980’s when drug lords became the primary leaders of favelas and operated primarily in 
extralegal channels (Perlman 2010:175).  
 Contemporary political organizations in favelas have shifted to a more policy-
oriented agenda. The push for the regularization of property has become the primary goal 
since the 1990’s, with the view that ownership guarantees residents a secure home and 
ensures the  “continued existence” of the favela (Santos Olivera 1996). Fontaine (1985) 
notes that these associations have "a detectable amount of interstitial or residual power, 
temporary perhaps, furtive or ephemeral, but not less real in those sectors [the favelas] of 
Brazilian society" (61). Community-based political organizations in favelas have 
empowered their residents to find viable channels to political power, leveraging their 
power and entering into consciousness about their rights as citizens.  
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These organizations introduced the idea of a right to legal rights, which is crucial 
in a democracy and for the pursuit of equality (Holston 1996b:722). “Among the 
conditions necessary for democracy is that people acknowledge those from different 
social groups as co-citizens, i.e., as people having similar rights,” notes Caldeira 
(1996:310). 
The municipal government has become more involved in the delivery of services 
in recent years. It launched Favela-Bairro, a “slum to neighborhood” project in 1995 with 
the goal of “promoting urban and social integration” and “reversing the process of urban 
decline that follows the growth of spontaneous low-income settlements in metropolitan 
areas” (Prefeitura de Cidade do Rio de Janeiro). It aims to update the urban infrastructure 
in 72 communities and thus better integrate them into the asfalto grid of official carioca 
life (Brakarz 2004). The program has seen some improvements in the physical 
infrastructure of favelas, but has been criticized for its forceful top-down approach to 
community work. The program has evolved in recent years into the Morar Carioca 
program, with a special focus on favelas surrounding Olympic sites.  
The distinct locations of agency between this governmental program and the 
political organizing based in favela communities speak to the different power dynamics in 
play in these two approaches. Who has control over the delivery of social services and 
infrastructure in Rio’s favelas illustrates the agency that residents have in determining 
their own fates. Governmental involvement may not necessarily translate to citizen 
control, as the Favela-Bairro program illustrates. This distinction is important in 
understanding the Olympic evictions in Morro da Providência and across the city.  
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2.8 Claims to legal property in favelas 
 A third crucial factor in shaping the rights and power of favelados is the 
regulation of property in the legal code. Property is a powerful asset that confers its 
owners economic agency (De Soto 2000:59). Property is closely associated with 
citizenship and property ownership often translates into rights.  
 The Brazilian legal system does not adequately regulate property law in its legal 
code, which in some cases leads to conflict and in other cases, to resolution or ignored 
and unperturbed extralegal practices (Holston 1991b). With roots in the colonial legal 
codes designed with the express intention of consolidating large swaths of land for rich 
elites, Brazilian land law is complex, contradictory and not designed with the interests of 
the poor and landless in mind (Holston 1991b).  
An intricate layering of conflicting laws on the municipal, state and federal level 
combined with irregular enforcement of the law has lead Holston (1991b) to conclude 
that “land law in Brazil promotes conflict, not resolution” (695). In his comprehensive 
analysis of Brazilian land law from the colonial period to the present, he argues that the 
law so frequently produces “unresolvable procedural and substantive complexity in land 
conflicts” that it initiates conflict and extrajudicial solutions. While in many cases this 
conflict leads to eviction, some residents have successfully leveraged the ambiguities and 
complexities of the legal code to their advantage. Usurpation may initiate a judicial 
settlement and has in some cases precipitated the legitimation of the land claims on the 
judicial level (Holston 1991b:700).  
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 Some legal codes, like the 1937 municipal Código das Obras directs that favelas be 
demolished. The 1956 municipal law directly contradicts this, declaring it illegal to evict 
favela residents, adding another dimension to this cacophony of legal codes. The 
ambiguities and inefficiencies of this legal system underlines "the unstable relationship 
between the legal and the illegal," and the context in which precarious housing in Rio de 
Janeiro takes place (Holston 1991b:717).  
 There are, however, several channels to claim property rights for favelados. A 
loophole in the 1916 civil code, Usucapião, can be a useful tool to claim land rights. The 
peaceful and uncontested occupation of land for more than 20 years confers occupants 
with a title to their property (Fernandes 2000).  
 This practice has evolved into a system of adverse possession that was codified in 
the 1988 constitution. Article 183 of the 1988 Brazilian constitution states that: 
He who possesses an urban area of up to two hundred and fifty square meters for 
five years without interruption or opposition, using it to your house or your family, 
you will acquire the domain, provided they do not own any other urban or rural 
property (Brazilian Constitution of 1988, translated by William Reichert).   
 
The law states that after five years of uncontested land possession, the land title is 
transferred to the current occupant. While this theory is a powerful concept, its 
implementation is spotty at best and has been highly contested by the government in 
cases of attempted enforcement (Fernandes 2000). 
 A more indirect channel to property title is the very illegality of land occupation. 
Many attempt to use the conflict to their advantage, which eventually confers them a 
legitimated claim to their precarious land occupation (Holston 1991b). “The illegality of 
their land occupation eventually prompts confrontation with legitimate authorities in 
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which residents usually succeed in legalizing their precarious land claims” (Holston 
1991b). Thus, “illegal appropriation becomes a basic means of land acquisition and 
illegality a common mode of social organization at all levels of Brazilian society” (Holston 
1991b).   
 This is not to say that the legal complications and irresolution in the “jural–
bureaucracy,” as Holston (1991b) describes it, are an ideally designed system. The 
imperfections certainly outweigh the benefits, and the challenges that residents of the 
informal housing sector face are steep. To fully lay claim to land ownership residents 
must register their lot with the Law of Public Registries. Further, the subdivision in which 
they are registered must be recognized, and there are many problems with fraudulent 
land swindlers providing false documentation of subdivision registry. These roadblocks 
often become prohibitive to favelados attempts at obtaining legal titles to their homes. 
In economist Hernando de Soto’s analysis of capitalism in non-Western nations, 
he argues that property exclusion is the ultimate conflict of a “capitalist apartheid” 
(2000:67). Informal property, he argues, must be incorporated into the formal property 
system before a society can become fully equal or realize its full economic potential. Such 
was the case in the United States, which “embraced extralegal settlement arrangements” 
as it emerged in the global economic arena (De Soto 2000:148) “The recognition and 
integration of extralegal property rights was a key element in the United States becoming 
the most important market economy and producer of capital in the world,” de Soto 
argues (148). As Brazil becomes an important player on the international economic stage, 
now is the time to restructure the economic property system throughout the country to 
promote more equitable distribution and access. 
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2.9 Land, power and citizenship: Fighting for “A right to the city”  
As favelados come to perceive themselves as citizens and recognize their rights to 
dignity, security and mobility, the fight for land ownership politicizes them and raises 
their consciousness about the fight for rights and resistance to the government removal 
programs.  
 Conflicts in the urban peripheries, in irregular residence, unemployment and 
poverty, often lead to a demand among the residents living on the margins for civil rights. 
From this notion, argues Holston (2010), arises a conception of citizenship, but one 
specific to urban contexts, mediated through an articulation of David Harvey’s notion of 
the right to city.  
 Harvey, writing at the beginning of Lula da Silva’s tenure in 2003, describes the 
need for a right to the city in the face of neoliberalism and privatizations. The right to the 
city is the right to change the city. Drawing on Marx, he argues: 
 
We change ourselves by changing our world. This dialectical relation lies at the root 
of all human labor. We individually and collectively make the city through our daily 
actions and our political, intellectual and economic engagements. But, in return, the 
city makes us (939). 
  
Cariocas shape the landscape of inequality in Rio de Janeiro, but this inequitable 
landscape reflects back on its residents as well. The geography of inequality and spatial 
violence creates people who are products of these elements. 
 Holston (2009) describes this fight for the right to the city in the Brazilian context, 
describing the phenomenon of “insurgent urban citizenship” as “the political 
transformation that occurs when the conviction of having a right to the city turns 
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residents into active citizens who mobilize their demands through residentially-based 
organizations that confront entrenched national regimes of citizen inequality” (264).  
 This approach to citizenship that Holston describes is circuitous and indirect, but 
this is precisely what favelados need to overcome in a complex web of historically defined 
conceptions of citizenship that extend beyond national membership.  
Brazil’s landed elites formulated a regime of citizenship using social differences 
that were not the basis of national membership — differences of education, 
property, race, gender, and occupation —  to distribute different treatment to 
different categories of citizens.  It thereby generated a gradation of rights among 
them, in which most rights are available only to particular kinds of citizens and 
exercised as the privilege of particular social categories (Holston 2010).  
 
This is the context in which the property renders favelados less than full citizens, and in 
which the government views them as expendable details in its overarching plans for the 
Olympics.   
3. Findings 
The current conflict: Favela removal in preparation for the 2016 Games   
The Olympics are reshaping the urban landscape of Rio de Janeiro through a 
series of preparatory infrastructure projects, carving deep gashes into the mountainous 
terrain and forcing residents out of their homes. Rio de Janeiro is constructing two new 
highways, building four Olympic sites, and is organizing dozens of localized urban 
renewal projects in neighborhoods around the city. The city is buzzing with construction.  
 These Olympic works are disproportionately affecting the poor living in favelas, 
whose legal claims to land are precarious at best. 7,185 households in favelas across the 
city face direct eviction (Comité Populario). This translates to 28,000 residents being 
forced out of their homes, assuming that each household holds only four family members 
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(Comité Populario). Actual figures are probably much higher, as a single home may hold 
multiple families, and families in favelas typically have more than two children (Pino 
1997a).  
 Poor cariocas living on the periphery of the city, in areas like Jacarepaguá, are 
being displaced by the TransOeste and TransOlímpica highway projects [Figure 1]. 
Cariocas living in more central favelas, like Metrô Mangueira are experiencing disruption 
due to stadium construction or renovations (Romero 2012). 4,000 residents of the Vila 
Autódromo favela, for example, will be removed to construct the Olympic Park (Romero 
2012). Other projects in the city center, like a cable car being constructed in Morro da 
Providência, are primarily being designed as tourist attractions for Olympic visitors. The 
municipal government frames these projects as pieces in a larger urban renewal scheme 
called Morar Carioca that involves crime reduction, housing improvements and better 
integration of the favelas into the social fabric of the city (Cidade Olímpica 2012a). Borne 
out of the Favela-Bairro program, residents are chafing against Morar Carioca’s 
aggressive hierarchical model of governmental involvement.   
The processes of displacement manifest themselves on two fronts: direct evictions 
of residents from land intended for the Olympics are coupled with indirect displacement 
mediated via gentrification or overzealous governmental interference in the social fabric 
of a community. These are programs framed to help develop the city, argues Mayor 
Eduardo Paes — “By 2020 we pledge that Rio will be urbanized, creating a city for all” — 
but the sad reality is that many people are being left behind in the rhetoric of 
inclusiveness (Selvanayagam 2010). 
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This analysis is concerned primarily with the people living in Rio’s favelas, and 
how the dynamics of urban planning, economic growth and globalization affect them. 
The Olympic works in Rio are too focused on improvements to the physical space, and 
are not paying enough attention to the local residents in the neighborhoods. This analysis 
aims to refocus the attention on the people and the lives being affected.  
3.1 Direct evictions 
While housing secretary Pierre Batista claims that “absolutely all of the favelas of 
Rio de Janeiro will benefit” from the Morar Carioca project, a number are in fact being 
totally razed (Selvanayagam 2010). Communities like Vila das Torres, 53-years old with 
300 families, Jacarepagúa, 75-years-old with 28 families, and Campinho, 33 years old and 
with 65 families are all facing complete demolition to make way for the TransOlímpica 
highway (Table 1). After being informed by the government that Morar Carioca 
neighborhood improvements would take place in the favela, the 2,000 residents of the 26-
year-old Vila União de Curicica, were then informed that their neighborhood would 
instead be demolished to make way for the TransOlímpica highway (Osborn 2012). Table 
1 offers a sample of a number of projects leading to evictions, offering a sense of the 
extent of displacement and its varied causes. Figure 1 charts these neighborhoods onto 
the physical landscape of the city to illustrate the magnitude of evictions and to 
demonstrate the clear correlation between the displaced neighborhoods and the Olympic 
works. 
A secondary dynamic of direct eviction is the governmental removal of people 
living in landslide risk areas. Neighborhoods like Trabajaras and Pavão Pavãozinho, as 
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well as Providência, have been identified as geologically precarious areas, and residents 
are thus being removed (Cidade Olímpica 2012a). 
The government has framed the works around the delivery of citizen rights and is 
describing it as a collaborative project between the government and residents. “All of the 
work will be done with a permanent dialogue with the communities, in line with the 
established principles of city administration: democratic management and participative 
construction,” said Housing Secretary Pierre Batista’s in an interview (Selvanayagam 
2010). But this rhetoric has not been employed in practice. Citizens’ rights to information 
are being violated — “the city enters the community, paints the house with X and people 
do not know why,” notes UN rapporteur on adequate housing Raquel Rolnik (2012). 
“Most communities are not informed of the development projects before they are 
removed. They have no chance to debate and present alternatives.”  
Further, the financial remunerations offered by the government pale in 
comparison to the original value of the homes, if compensation is offered at all. 
Considering the updates and residents have invested in their houses, the 5,000 reais, 
about US$2,500, that the government is offering does not match all invested costs (Rolnik 
2012). It is not enough money to enable a family to relocate and purchase another 
comparable home in terms of quality and location. 
  The projects based in Olympic areas reveal contrasts of effort, where the touristic 
areas receive more investments, and the peripheral neighborhoods receive less or no 
attention. These projects emphasize the social isolation, touristic performance and 
control of people in this very segregated city.  
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3.2 Morar Carioca 
This social program is the leading cause of indirect displacement via gentrification 
and infrastructure works framed as neighborhood improvements. The Morar Carioca 
plan, launched in 2010, was borne out of an earlier project called Favela-Bairro, which 
aimed to integrate favelas into the urban fabric of Rio de Janeiro. Morar Carioca is a 10-
year program that aims to update the urban infrastructure surrounding 240,000 homes in 
the city’s favelas and incorporate them into the governmentally recognized urban grid 
(Daflon 2011). Roughly translating to “to live as a resident of Rio de Janeiro,” Morar 
Carioca addresses outdated water and sewage pipes, road pavements, wider streets, and 
transportation (Cidade Olímpica 2012a). It is being run by the government in 
conjunction with the Instituto do Arquiteto do Brasil, IAB-RJ (Selvanayagam 2010).  
The rhetoric surrounding Morar Carioca promises integration and inclusion of 
favelados. “Morar Carioca has the objective of guaranteeing the access to dignified living 
and urban infrastructure for lower income earners — which is a basic social right,” notes 
housing secretary Batista (Selvanayagam 2010).  From this perspective, the program aims 
to be inclusive of the less developed neighborhoods of the city and to leverage the 
excitement around the Olympics to distribute development benefits across the entire. The 
program’s aims are to increase the standard of living and to reduce crimes — goals 
welcomed by the favela residents.  
Some communities, like Barreira do Vasco, are leveraging the government’s 
interest in development and are observing positive change in their neighborhood. This 
particular community is seeking running water and electricity and sanitation updates, as 
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well as wider alleyways to improve air circulation and to allow for wheelchairs to pass 
(Clarke 2013).  
 But the Morar Carioca program has all-too-frequently resulted in population 
displacement, either by gentrification or by a more direct and forceful removal to make 
way for infrastructure updates. Real estate prices have shot up in some favelas, pricing out 
long-term residents. In Recreio and Barra da Tijuca, for example, property prices 
increased more than 50 percent in 2010 when Morar Carioca work started in these areas 
(Schwambach 2012). In Providência, the value of commercial real estate grew 20 percent 
in the first two months of 2013. This is twice the rate recorded in the rest of the city over 
the same period of time (Barbosa 2013).   
Another fundamental problem with the Morar Carioca project is its top-down 
approach. The fate of a neighborhood is being handed down by the government in 
conjunction with the Instituto do Arquitetos do Brasil, rather than being produced 
through community-government collaboration. This is in direct conflict with the Morar 
Carioca program’s rhetorical goal of favela integration. I discuss the perils of this 
approach in the specific case of Providência in further detail below.  
3.3 UPP (Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora — Police Pacification Units) 
Closely linked to the Morar Carioca program is the Police Pacification Unit 
(UPP), which is a governmental program aimed at pacifying neighborhoods and  
reclaiming territories from drug gangs. The program was launched in 2008, just before 
Rio was named host to the World Cup and Olympics, but pacification efforts were 
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ramped up with Olympic developments. Thirteen UPPs have been constructed and 
installed in neighborhoods around Olympic venues since Rio was awarded its bid.  
The police units have been widely acknowledged to be effective in reducing crime 
in the areas in which they have been implemented. Pacified favelas have homes made of 
brick and concrete, have higher levels of employment, and have high levels of resident 
retention (Williamson 2012). Further, they provide the “invaluable public service of 
security,” (Williamson 2012).  
But it is unclear if the poor residents of pacified neighborhoods will be able to stay 
and enjoy the benefits. Pacification has lead to gentrification in neighborhoods like 
Vigidal, where rich foreigners are moving in to enjoy the hillside views of Copacabana 
Beach (Vitali 2013). “Only the middle class favela dwellers will be able to afford to stay in 
these locations,” notes Theresa Williamson (2012), director of the community blog 
RioOnWatch. 
Another group that is missing out on the safety provided by the UPPs are 
residents of favelas not in close proximity to the Olympic venues (Carvalho de Araujo 
Silva 2011). This suggests, again, that the government’s focus is not on the wellbeing of its 
residents, but rather, on the projection of an image of security to the incoming 
international community. Only the touristic neighborhoods need to be safe to make the 
entire city seem safe.  
“Pacification can only be understood from analysis about who the spectators of 
this state performance are,” notes anthropologist Marcella Carvalho de Araujo Silva 
(2011). “Pacification leaves the still-violent favelas out of the urban imaginary… and 
turns wide areas of the city invisible” (18). This practice recalls the walling off of the 
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“poor and violent reality” of the favelas in preparation for the 2007 Pan American Games 
and again in preparation for the Olympics to project a tranquil image of Rio for place-
promotion (Curi et al 2011).  
To effectively address the problems in favelas across the city, the government 
would have to acknowledge them. And, as Carvalho de Araujo Silva (2011) argues, an 
acknowledgement of the persistent problems would “deprive the government of its 
investments in the elaborate process of Rio’s representation as a safe city and its 
valorization in the global market” (18).  
The UPP’s may be effective in their Olympic-area neighborhoods, but they 
function as much for the performance of safety in particular areas as they do for effecting 
real change. “In order to deconstruct Rio de Janeiro’s representation as a violent city, it 
has been made an effort to convey the reverse image, namely, of a safe city” (Carvalho de 
Araujo Silva 2011). The intersection between the UPP program and the upcoming mega-
events is one of performance and display, conforming to international expectations rather 
than acting purely in the interest of favelados across the city.  
In Providência, deemed worthy of governmental intervention due to its proximity 
to the Olympic Venues, 208 officers with the 7th UPP, established itself in April, 2010. 
Residents have chafed with police officers over the right to express themselves — a July 
2011 protest over the removal of the Plaza América Brum was shut down by the police, 
not only denying residents their right to public space but also to their right to protest its 
removal (De Rose 2011).  
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3.4 Porto Maravilha  
 A third branch of Olympic development is the Porto Maravilha project, which is 
focused on encouraging economic growth specifically in the Port region near the city 
center. Similar to the other projects, it aims to update infrastructure and provide higher 
quality public services, but this project also puts a heavy emphasis on economic 
development (Porto Maravilha 2013). The project includes piers for cruise ships, an 
extension of the Plaza Mauá and creating more open space (Porto Maravilha 2013).  
It has proven to be one of the most disruptive programs, displacing almost 600 
people in the area (Figure 1; Table 1). In the same pattern as we see with Morar Carioca, 
the economic development orientation of this program has lead this project to too heavily 
privilege improvements of the physical space rather than improvements over the well-
being of residents. "The public funds are being invested in a “fast-paced process of 
gentrification” (Williamson 2012). 
To an even greater extent than with the case of Morar Carioca, Porto Maravilha is 
adopting exclusive development approaches only designed for the rich. Urban planner 
Karin Schwambach argues that this development is exclusively targeted at upper-class 
consumers.  “At the present time, low-income families occupy the area and the project 
does not present concrete plans including these people. The project aims to renovate the 
area, bringing ‘new people,’” which is coded language for an exclusive gentrification 
process (Schwambach 2012:7).  
This Port Region, which is already economically healthy, is not the area of the city 
that needs development and attention. The city is “strengthening the centrality of this 
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middle class area and benefitting few,” notes Rolnik in a 2011 interview with Carolina 
Derivi about her research in Rio. “The Port is not the Rio that most needs urban 
intervention.”  
3.5 Morro da Providência: a case study 
 I chose Providência as my case study primarily because of the long history of the 
neighborhood and the integral role it has played in Rio de Janeiro for 115 years. In a land 
property system where “history often confers legitimacy,” not even Latin America’s oldest 
favela can survive the force of Olympic works. Having resisted over a century of 
concerted favela removal attempts, it is falling victim to a carefully orchestrated Olympic 
eviction program that will remove 832 neighborhood’s residents in favor of a tourism-
focused cable car.  
3.5.1 The cable car  
 Through a joint effort between Morar Carioca and Porto Maravilha, 
governmental construction work in Providência aims to invest R$131 million (~US$ 65 
million) in reurbanization and revitalization in this area, where 5,500 residents live in 
1,720 households. “When the works are finished it will be more accurate to call 
Providência a bairro, not a favela” said Jorge Bittar, municipal housing secretary, to the 
publication O Globo (Daflon 2011).  
Non-invasive infrastructure updates to water pipes, street paving, and sewage and 
drainage have not been met with much resistance in the neighborhood, but a 
controversial project to build a cable car linking the favela to the city center has proven 
very divisive and disruptive. The cable car is set to open in May 2013 and will displace 832 
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families in the process of its construction. It is framed by the government as a transport 
system that will connect the residents of Providência  — those who remain — with the 
Central do Brasil, the city’s transit hub, but residents would rather keep their homes 
[Figure 2]. 
In theory, capitalizing on Olympics construction to provide transit infrastructure 
to link the favelados of Providência to the city center sounds like a reasonable plan. But 
the government’s rhetoric falls flat — the tramway is framed as a connecting artery to 
better integrate favelados in Providência to the rest of the city, but as a transportation 
project, the sky tram has unclear benefits. Many residents feel the new line is unnecessary: 
Providência is only a 15-minute walk to the Central station, and there are already roads 
providing access to the community (Roller 2011). Residents also feel that if the work is 
truly intended to better integrate the community, the government’s work is incomplete: 
the new line runs halfway up the hill and does not reach the people who live at Cruzeiro, 
the highest point of the favela (Roller 2011). Further, the volume of travelers for which 
the tramway is designed — up to 3,000 people per hour — is out of line with the number 
of Providência residents, which numbered 5,000 total before a third of the 
neighborhood’s residents were slated to be removed (Williamson and Hora 2012).  
Thus, the gondola, which will provide beautiful views of the city, seems to be 
designed more for tourists than for residents. Ironically, Victor Ricardo, an engineer for 
the Secretary of Municipal Housing, hails the project as a success . “It’ll be easier to get 
home now,” he says (Cidade Olímpica 2012). This may be true for the Providência 
residents that remain, but certainly not for the 832 families that will be displaced.  The air 
tram is framed as an improvement to residents’ quality of life but it is evicting residents 
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and tearing down important community spaces like the Américo Brum Square, a 
recreational space and place of historical memory for Rio’s oldest favela and its residents. 
These changes are deeply detrimental to community life.  
Community members were not involved in the generation of plans for this project 
and they feel it will not adequately fit their needs. The Providência Residents Commission 
cites a similar project that installed a cable car in Complexo de Alemão that is underused 
and is out of line with the community needs (Providência Residents Commission 2012). 
The general perception held by Providência residents is that the city sees the gorgeous 
views from Providência as a nice spot for tourists to view the city and has no genuine 
interests in improving their neighborhood.  
3.5.2 Evictions and inadequate compensation  
 832 households living in Latin America’s oldest favela, the 115-year-old Morro da 
Providência, are at risk of eviction in this neighborhood. A third of the population faces 
eviction. 317 houses are being destroyed to make way for the cable car that will provide 
Olympics visitors nice views of the city; another 515 have been deemed located in 
geologically risky areas and are thus being demolished (Providência Residents 
Commission 2012).  
The government has identified the houses on the western side of the famous 
staircase that divides the neighborhood in half as at risk of a landslide (Grem-Nielsen 
2013). An independent study by local engineers found that the city’s reports of geological 
risk were unfounded: the city’s study was incomplete and inaccurate, according to the 
analysis conducted by civil engineers and architects from the Regional Consultants on 
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Engineering and Agriculture (CREA) (Campos dos Santos and Faria Asevedo 2011). 
Residents detect the contradictory information provided by the government: “they said 
they were going to protect us by moving us out of our houses but we had other people 
come in and survey the land and they found no problems,” said Diego (Voices of the 
Mission). 
 While evictions are not compulsory, the demolition of properties in the 
immediate vicinity leaves unbearable conditions of rubble and desolation for those who 
choose to stay behind (Tapley 2012a).  
 The city has plans to construct 639 housing units to make up for those lost 
through the Minha Casa Minha Vida housing program (Providência Residents 
Commission). The housing is located just blocks away from the original homes of the 
residents, which marks a significant improvement from early patterns of favela removal 
that forced residents miles away from their former homes and workplaces. But there will 
be a 193-unit shortage, assuming that home currently occupied only houses one family. 
This is often not the case: multiple generations, or different families, often cohabitate 
under one roof (Pino 1997a). The new homes are designed for single-family units, so the 
shortage is likely to be much higher. Only 170 units are currently under construction, and 
as of March 2013 the projects were stalled, as some housing units were found structurally 
sound and are now being slated for demolition (Carvalho 2013). Further, it remains to be 
seen if these new homes, once complete, will be affordable to the displaced community. 
 The compensation provided to the evicted families is insufficient — “ridiculous,” 
according to Raquel Rolnik — to account for their losses. The R$3800 (about US$2,000) 
that the government is offering residents until new homes have been constructed for 
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them is not enough to purchase a new home. Raquel Rolnik, UN rapporteur on adequate 
housing, found that the municipality only compensates residents for improvements made 
on the land — the property built — without considering the value of the land on which it 
is located, despite what is outlined in the Constitution and the Statute of Cities (Rolnik 
2011). This compensation figure is significantly lower than what the residents deserve, 
and further, housing prices have already begun to rise as the government constructs new, 
modern housing (Plataforma Dhesca 2011). In the vicinity of Morro da Providência, the 
square meter in new buildings increased from R$500 ten years ago to about R$1,200 this 
past year, a 240 percent increase (Colbert 2012). One resident, who accepted 
governmental compensation, bought land located 2.5 hours away in Guartiba because she 
could not afford anything closer (Grem-Nielsen 2013).  
The city violated a number of procedural requirements before starting the work in 
Providência. It did not conduct a compulsory report on the environmental impact study 
and neighborhood relations that the construction would have on the neighborhood 
before construction started, though this analysis is required by municipal law (Public 
Defender of the State of Rio de Janeiro). Further, the municipality is required to host a 
public hearing to provide residents with “ample access” to information regarding the 
timeframe of the construction, the compensation evicted residents should receive, and a 
fair forewarning before they would be evicted (Tapley 2012a). This procedure was 
completely ignored by the municipal government. 
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3.5.3 United Nations findings  
The City of Rio de Janeiro, in conjunction with the UN Department on Human 
Rights is in the process of investigating the impacts of construction for the World Cup 
and the Olympics in Rio. The Plataforma Brasileira de Diretos Humanos Econômicos, 
Sociais, Culturais e Ambientais (Dhesca) found that citizens most frequently expressed 
frustration with the lack of transparency and lack of information provided by the 
government. “The communities denounced the lack of transparency on the part of public 
bodies, because they lack access to public information and no right to participate in 
decisions about the areas where they live” (Plataforma Dhesca 2011). 
"They marked my house with no explanation or information — just a mark,” 
explained Luis, a lifetime Providência resident. “And they gave me until he end of the 
month to leave — what am I supposed to do?” (Voices of the Mission) 
Rolnik’s reporting for the UN found similar results. Providência residents have 
been denied “the right to information, transparency and participation. These are the basic 
rights that make up the right to housing and they are being systematically violated in Rio” 
(2011). In some cases, families were evicted overnight — according to the Providência 
Residents Commission (2012), 60 families living on Ladeira do Farias were informed that 
they had to move the following day in 2012. 
3.5.4 A top-down approach 
Further frustration of Providência residents is grounded in the government’s 
narrow top-down approach to the works. Residents were not involved in the planning of 
this major construction in their community. “They never asked us what we think… they 
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didn’t show us the blueprint,” explained Rosiette, a Providência resident (Voices of the 
Mission).  
The case of the Américo Brum Square is telling — this was the center of 
community activity for Providência and an important space for community interaction 
for groups of all ages. “One of the oldest public spaces in the community, Américo Brum 
Square was the only recreation area in the favela and was part of the affective memory of 
generations of residents” (Bahia 2012). “All of the community’s parties were at Américo 
Brum Square,” said Marcia de Deus, a Providência resident who has lived there for 20 
years. “Now all that’s finished. Streets were closed without consulting residents. They 
came in here and they don’t care about anything” (Bahia 2012).  
The square has been demolished, and is now the site of a cable car station. 
Construction in the site was disruptive: it ran every day, including Saturdays, Sundays 
and holidays (Bahia 2012). Residents protested the removal of Américo Brum Square, but 
the UPP officers forcefully blocked the protest and the demolition of the square was 
quickly completed. 
Luiz Fernandez Janot argues that public squares are a community right, and an 
important space for equitable social interaction and a place for communities to 
autonomously determine their social space (De Rose 2011). In this context, the loss of 
Américo Brum Square is a further violation of rights. It is also a violation of the right to 
the city, of the ability to “change our world after our heart’s desire” (Harvey 2003:939). 
The municipal government acknowledges the importance of community spaces —  
it has plans to construct a new cultural center for Providência, as well as a child 
development center and an employment center (Cidade Olímpica). But the fundamental 
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issue many community residents are raising with this model is that it is a top-down 
approach, providing services to the community that the government deems necessary, 
rather than programs asked for or designed by the community itself. The community is 
also starting work on an employment organization called the Commerce Work Group. 
The government should be encouraging and supporting this program, rather than 
undermining the work of the community by constructing a separate employment center 
that will serve a similar purpose (Clarke 2012). 
The government claims to be inclusive in its approach. “We have been spending a 
considerable amount of time within the favelas to gain a detailed understanding of the 
true needs as well as building long term relationships with the well-established social 
projects operating in the communities,” said Sonia Lopes of the IAb-RJ, the construction 
firm working with the city government (Selvanayagam 2010). 
 But this is not what community members are saying —  they’re protesting against 
the uncollaborative nature of the projects. “I’m not against the works,” noted Cosme 
Felipe, a 23-year old who has lived in Providência his whole life. “We’re against the city 
authorities and the workers’ approach. The lack of information, the lack of consulting 
people that live there on how to do this, what to do, whether we want it… It is not just 
information we want, we want interaction between the people and the secretariats of 
housing and works to know what’s happening and also make proposals” (Providência 
Residents Commission). 
What community members are asking for is a dialogue between themselves and 
the government as a means of empowerment. Brazilian education theorist Paulo Friere 
describes the need for a dialogical model at great length in his seminal work Pedagogy of 
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the Oppressed (1970). He argues that dialogue is the only path to liberation: “leaders who 
do not act dialogically, but insist on imposing their decisions, do not organize the people, 
they manipulate them. They do not liberate, nor are they liberated: they oppress” (127).  
“We want a transformation of the favela but everyone wants this transformation 
to be participatory,” says Mauricio Hora, Providência resident and photographer 
organizing a public arts movement in protest. “When authorities come into the 
community, they should understand what the residents want. We have nothing against 
improvements and development of our city, but we are worried that Rio’s government is 
not hearing our concerns” (Assefa).  
The top-down work is highly performative, evoking the problems with the Porto 
Maravilha and Morar Carioca projects. Luis, a resident of Morro da Providência, detects 
the performative nature of the works, observing that the work is purely aesthetic. “They’re 
working on cosmetics. These projects aren’t for the community; they’re for foreigners to 
come see. Why didn’t they build a health clinic?” he asks (Voices of the Mission). 
The surface-level changes do not reflect what the community members need or 
want, but rather represent what the outside world wants to see. “Rio suffers from the 
chronic problem of flashy public works projects when in reality what most residents need 
and want are service and utility improvements that are less visible as marketing platforms 
(Grem-Nielsen 2013).  
3.5.5 Perceptions of displacement 
They want us to leave. It is like they’re indirectly ordering you to get out… They’re 
not thinking about residents. They’re thinking about the works. — Cosme Felipe, 23, 
law student and Providência resident (Tapley 2012a) 
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 They are trying to deliberately evict us so they can build something else, and we 
don’t even know what that is. They came here thinking their project would be 
successful whether we want it or not, and we have to accept it. It will be a port for 
tourists. Tourists are going to be coming here because of the proximity and the view 
we have of this entire area. But we’re still fighting. —Diego, 23, Providência resident 
(Voices of the Mission) 
 
 This lack of agency felt by many residents is underlined by a perception of 
displacement and dispossession that the residents are experiencing. “The government is 
trying to destroy Morro da Providência,” said Iraci, a resident of Morro da Providência, 
to Plataforma Dhesca’s Rapporteur on the Human right to the City (Voices of the 
Mission). “I was born here. My mother was born here and died here. They’re going to put 
an end to the community and I don’t know what to do. I’m fighting for the place where I 
was born.”  
 There’s an intangible connection to place that cannot be compensated, especially 
when residents built their houses with their own hands. “Every brick you see in my house, 
I made myself,” notes Luis, who was informed he had a month to move out of his home 
(Voices of the Mission).  
 This is a complete disruption of life for people who have lived in Providência their 
whole lives. “Most residents have been here for more than 20 years. Our entire life is here, 
our children’s lives, our grandchildren’s. Everything is nearby: school, hospitals, work, the 
market, recreation, etc. We believe the City government is largely responsible for all this 
trouble, and we are coming together to guarantee that no more houses will be torn down, 
and that the improvements will actually benefit us,” notes the Providência Residents 
Commission’s open letter.  
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3.5.6 Resistance  
 Providência residents have not taken the aggressive removal campaigns lying 
down. The community response to the evictions in Providência has been mediated 
through judicial, social and artistic protest.   
 Community activists came together to form the Providência Residents’ 
Commission and the Providência Housing Rights Commission. The Residents’ 
Commission wrote an open letter to the city describing the violations they have suffered 
to raise awareness. They see the municipal government as “largely responsible for all this 
trouble,” but see their collective organizational power as proportionally strong to respond 
to it (Providência Residents Commission 2012). “We are coming together to guarantee 
that no more houses will be torn down, and that the improvements will actually benefit 
us,” the letter says (2012).  
 Photographer Mauricio Hora, founder of Favelarte, launched a successful protest 
through images. He took portraits of residents threatened with eviction and pasted large 
prints of their faces to the sides of their homes, putting a literal face to the evictions 
[Figure 5]. The faces humanized the process and created a forum for residents to “show 
their indignation,” as Hora described it (Assefa 2012). The effort was a success: the city 
did not demolish any of the houses it had marked for eviction that had been wrapped in 
residents’ portraits.  
In a city where visibility is so crucial, Hora’s efforts to give a face to the 
Providência favela were crucial in the project’s success. “I consider photography a tool 
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that I can use to give the people from Providência visibility, give them a face, in these 
important changing times for Rio” (Maresch 2011).  
 Smaller groups of neighbors are coming together and organizing micro-protests 
of the physical evictions. Marcia Regina de Deus is refusing to move out of the apartment 
on Ladeira do Barroso, where she has lived for 20 years. The apartment building, built in 
1938, is directly located in the line of work of the cable car. Of the nine families that 
occupied the building prior to eviction, four other families are standing their ground with 
her.   
 The Providência Residents Commission has also partnered with citywide 
coalitions like the Comité Popular Rio Copa e Olimpíadas (Popular Committee for the 
World Cup and Olympics) to increase its power. Forming coalitions with other favelas 
has been effective in strengthening the voice of the evicted favelados. Coalitions are 
widely viewed by community organizers as effective in generating more power and 
visibility for awareness and resistance campaigns (Bobo et al 2010:98).  
 The Residents Commission is also engaging in media activism. Working through 
preexisting communications structures, it has raised awareness about the evictions in its 
neighborhood. The media activist blog Rio Olympics Neighborhood Watch 
(RioOnWatch) has provided an outlet for evicted favelados from across the city to express 
themselves. It’s a forum for community organizers and residents to voice their 
frustrations and experiences, and to demonstrate trends across neighborhoods.  
 Resident-based resistance has also taken hold on the judicial level. Neuzimar, a 
Providência resident who has been threatened with eviction from the home she shares 
with her elderly mother, took the municipal government to court in September 2012 to 
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contest the works (Tapley 2012a). Her complaint echoed the concerns voiced by her 
neighbors: she cited the highly disruptive nature of the evictions, and focused on her 
frustration at the lack of communication between the city and Providência residents.  
 The court ruled in Neuzimar’s favor: the 2nd Court of Public Finance Capital 
ordered the city to shut down work in the Providência.  
The decision determines the municipality to shut down or suspend the works of the 
“Morar Carioca” project in Providência, and to refrain from any act of demolition or 
disturbance of premises occupied by residents until they are remedied by the 
municipality. (Public Defender of the State of Rio de Janeiro.)  
 
The municipal government will be fined R$50,000 daily for noncompliance.  
The decision centered on a number of procedural failures by the municipal 
government. The government did not prepare an Environmental Impact Study or a 
Report on the Neighborhood impact for Providência, though it was legally required to do 
so. Though the government conducted a public hearing to announce the works, the 
meeting did not convey the legally required information. The city is mandated to 
“efficiently deliver the right information with the mechanisms for broad access to 
community information on the progress of the work and claims by affected residents, and 
to provide prior notice to residents before eviction” which it did not do. It did not 
provide prior notification to residents about eviction. Many residents first became aware 
of their eviction when the government marked their home with SMH — Municipal 
Housing Secretary — the sign of demolition [Figure 4]. Further, it did not inform 
residents facing eviction of their right to monetary compensation. Raquel Rolnik’s 
findings in Providência support this conclusion: “There is no place where you can see 
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exactly who will be removed and how much they will be compensated for, and what the 
alternatives are to removal” (2012). 
 All work is currently suspended, but because the municipal government appealed 
the decision, it is likely that a higher court will declare special circumstances for the 
Games. This is the case that a robust and expensive team of lawyers for the municipal 
government is arguing (Fórum Comunitário do Porto 2012). “Brazilian law is adapting to 
carry out the Games, rather than the Games adapting to fit the law,” said Alex Magalhães, 
professor at Rio’s Federal University, in an interview on the topic with Simon Romero of 
The New York Times (2012). The work may not be completed on time, but it will most 
likely be completed and 832 residents in Providência will be forced out of their homes.  
 This case illustrates that there are legal channels for favelados to exploit to fight 
for their rights, but that the inefficiencies and vulnerabilities in the legal system render 
the practical delivery of these rights untenable.  
4. Conclusion 
4.1 Summary of key findings 
 Rio de Janeiro is not ready to host the Olympics. The Games put acute pressure 
on the existing structures of the host city, and the race to prepare for the Olympiad 
strains the fault lines in the city’s systems. Mega-events pressure developing cities to 
create infrastructure at a rate that outpaces and strains the political and social realms. 
 Brazil’s legal, social and political structures are not yet equipped support the 
demands of the Olympics. The inefficiencies in the Brazilian legal regulation of property 
intensify the standard conflict of Olympic and local interests on the real estate level. The 
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Olympics stand to exacerbate preexisting economic inequality and socio-political 
tensions between the favelas and the government.   
 Olympic development especially evokes a long and difficult relationship between 
the informal housing sector and the municipal government. This work represents a 
continuation of previous housing policies rather than a rupture. “Rio’s Olympic branding 
has fostered new projects with old ambitions,” as anthropologist Marcella Carvalho de 
Araujo Silva (2011) describes it.  The frenzy, excitement and pressure created by the 
Olympics heightens existing tensions in the favela-government relationship as the 
municipality comes up against non-negotiable deadlines and is forced to make quick 
decisions about the fastest way to get the work done. Because the government has always 
seen favelas as expendable and undesirable, they are an easy choice to make way for 
exciting Olympic projects. The 7,000 families that have faced or will face eviction are just 
the latest victims of an aggressive government whose aim has always been to remove the 
city’s favelas.  
 In addition to recalling past problems, it also remains to be seen what the legacy of 
the Games will be in Rio after the Closing Ceremony ends. Such tumultuous preparations 
for the Olympiad do not bode well for a positive legacy.  
 The Olympics bring the acute tension between global and local interests to the fore.  
Rio’s municipal government should be “looking for the equilibrium between success in 
the global arena and solutions for local social problems,” rather than focusing exclusively 
on developing for tourism (Curi et. al 2011).  
The Olympic works are focused on improving the physical space of Rio’s favelas 
— of raising property value and the physical infrastructure of the neighborhoods — but 
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not enough attention has been lent to improving the living conditions of the people who 
live in those spaces.  
In a dynamic of visibility and performance, the projects are for touristic display —
 for painting an image of Rio de Janeiro to the outside world that conforms with Saskia 
Sassen’s criteria for a global city. If the welfare of the people were the primary motivator, 
then people would not be forced out of their homes and provided minimal compensation.  
 Recent efforts at integration — which seem surface-level and highly rhetorical at 
best — have been misguided. The government’s top-down approach is destined to fail; a 
horizontal model that incorporates community members who voice their own opinions 
would be more effective. What Rio needs instead are community-driven organizations 
that mobilize not only in response to adversity but also organize to effect positive change 
in their communities. Further, it needs to bolster the legal channels in its judicial system 
to better support the poor.  
 As long as the government views its work as “help” rather than a mutually 
beneficial project aimed at improving the city as a whole, the location of power will 
remain in the hands of the government and Rio will continue to suffer from paralyzing 
inequality. The city is on the starting blocks, primed to take off, but it cannot realize its 
full potential until the government and the poor work together. As the maxim goes, “If 
you’ve come here to help me, you’re wasting your time. But if you’ve come because your 
liberation is bound up with mine, then let us work together.” The entire city stands to 
benefit from economic development, but a collaborative and participatory approach is 
essential to this work.  
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4.2 Significance of findings  
 The case of Rio 2016 highlights the tensions and pitfalls of employing the 
Olympics as a mechanism for social and economic development. It’s an instructive case 
for future mega-event hosts, especially those in developing countries like Qatar and 
Russia. The structural strains of inequality on the social fabric of the city, combined with 
the major infrastructure projects that the city is undertaking show that the city is simply 
not ready to host the Games in a way that is beneficial to its residents across all social 
strata. Mega-sports events like the Olympics have not yet proven to be an effective means 
for inclusive economic and social growth in developing countries. 
 Rio 2016 shows us that the Olympics need to fit into a larger development 
scheme. The Olympics cannot be the development a city seeks, but rather must be a 
byproduct of successful and inclusive growth. The Olympics need to be transparent, 
participatory and just.  
 There is still time for Rio to learn from its mistakes, to respond to the voices of the 
community that are rising up in protest and integrate the real needs of favelas — 
community engagement, inclusive growth, affordable housing and viable integration 
models — into its development plans. The judiciary could uphold the 2nd court’s ruling on 
Providência, choosing not to capitulate to the finances of the government. With a little 
less than three years to go until the Opening Ceremony, there is still time for reevaluation 
and redirection.  
 If Rio learns from its early missteps, this will truly be a Games to celebrate. Rio 
2016 stands to provide a compelling Olympic legacy and a mega-sports event model to 
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the rest of the developing world for inclusive development. If the city finds a successful 
and effective model improves the quality of life in its favelas, it can offer important 
lessons to the world, where three billion people will be living in slums by 2050 (UN-
Habitat). The problems Rio faces are not unique, and it does not face them alone: the 
world has a lot to learn from a successful slum management project in Rio.  
 Developing nations like Brazil are at a crossroads. As their economies take off, and 
GDPs grow, governments must focus on ensuring that growth is inclusive and equally 
accessible to all sectors of society. Rather than perpetuating inequality, becoming a 
“playground for the rich,” governments like Brazil’s need to promote equitable growth 
(Williamson and Hora 2012). The poor, for their part, must organize and recognize their 
agency, and “force a major redistribution of power” (De Soto 2000:103). The government, 
in return, must respond to the demands of the poor: “once they accept that, they can 
begin to catch the wave instead of being engulfed by it” (De Soto 2000:103). Encouraging 
inclusive growth across all sectors of society would ultimately strengthen the economy 
and empower the city’s marginalized populations (Williamson and Hora 2013). 
 In the short term, emerging countries should focus on internal growth, on 
strengthening its systems and structures and encouraging growth among all of its publics. 
In the long term, developing countries should aim for global economic and cultural 
ascendancy that incorporates its entire society, so that it can stage a successful and 
universally beneficial Olympics when it is ready. 
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5. Methodological appendix 
 The currency of this case study made for a compelling and exciting analysis, but 
one that brought with it a host of challenges. I drew heavily on news media for the most 
up-to-date information, but details of the Providência case study, like the court case that 
would stop evictions, are still unresolved.  Insofar as I gathered firsthand experiences 
from news interviews and human rights organizations, there is an inherent level of bias in 
this work. I would have preferred to gather data myself, to get a sense of the environment 
and mood in Providência throughout these evictions, but logistical, financial and 
language barriers prevented this approach to data collection. 
 Very little concrete primary data exists on the case of Rio 2016. This is in part due 
to the reluctance of city officials to provide a transparent look into its work. This is 
somewhat balanced by the work of activists like Theresa Williamson, who has synthesized 
available data onto the RioOnWatch blog, but this analysis has a particular ideological 
bent to it. 
 Because the construction in Providência is occurring right now, it is hard to 
measure the long-term effects that the cable car will have on the neighborhood. Further, 
the effects of the Games — long-term or short-term — are yet to be seen.  
 The currency of the events has made it difficult to find peer-reviewed literature on 
the subject, making independent analyses hard to come by. While there is much merit to 
first-hand accounts and community organizing commentary, independent experts 
provide an important perspective that is currently missing from this case. Media that is 
simultaneously playing a role as informant and activist has its inherent biases. Further, 
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mainstream Brazilian media in Rio de Janeiro is influenced in part by governmental 
interests  — O Globo was very hesitant to give the evictions any coverage (Consentino 
2011).  
 To balance these challenges, I drew heavily on case studies and theory that 
explored mega-events and community organizing in Brazil. Rio 2016 is not occurring in 
isolation, but rather is playing into larger trends in Olympic development. But drawing 
on case studies has its limitations — each Olympiad and mega-event is unique, with 
historical and social contextual variables leading to its success or failure. To fully 
understand Rio 2016, we will have to wait to see how this particular case plays out. This 
analysis of the Games as a current event will be a useful contribution to future studies of 
the thirty-first Olympiad as a historical event. 
 There was also a level of selection bias in the case study I analyzed. Providência is 
one of the more organized and cohesive favelas. The technological and organizational 
barriers to communication that some residents in Providência faced, as well as residents 
of other favelas, biases my findings towards a certain demographic. The experiences of 
unorganized communities are no less valid than those of the outspoken members of 
Morro da Providência. Not all residents had there wherewithal or legal know-how to take 
the municipal government to court.  
 The language barrier proved to be much less of a limitation that I initially 
suspected. Between Google translate and my fluency in Spanish, I could easily navigate 
sites written in Portuguese. I had more trouble with spoken interviews, having to rely on 
second-hand subtitle translations.  
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Table [1]
Table 1: Families from favelas across the city face eviction in preparation for the Games.  
Adapted from a comprehensive study conducted by the activist organization Comité Popular 
da Copa e Olimpíadas (2011).
Community Duration of 
occupation
No. removed 
families
No. families 
threatened
Total Reason cited
Campinho 1980 65 total eviction 65 BRT Transcarioca
Rua do Livramento unknown — 400 400 Porto Maravilha
Boa Vista 1998 35 — 35 Porto Maravilha
Morro da Providência 1898  — 835 835 Cable car/risk area
Trabajaras 1986 120 230 350 Risk area
TOTAL — 1,860 5,325 7,185 Cable car/risk area
NUMBER OF FAMILIES FACING EVICTION BY COMMUNITY IN RIO DE JANEIRO, 2011
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Arroio Pavuna 1938 — 28 28 BRT Transcarioca
Asa Branca 1986 — 2000 2000 BRT Transolímpica
Favela do Sambódromo unknown 60 total eviction 60 Sambódromo construction
Favela Belém 1972 — 300 300 Stadium construction
Flor do Asfalto 2006 — 30 30 Porto Maravilha
Rua Domingos Lopes unknown 100 — 100 BRT Transcarioca
Rua Quáxima 1970 24 — 27 BRT Transcarioca
Vila das Torres 1960 300 total eviction 300 Municipal park
Vila Recreio II 1996 235 total eviction 235 BRT Transoeste
Vila Azaleia 1990  — 100 500 BRT Transolímpica
Vila Taboinha 1990 — 400 400 Govt land reclamation
Metrô Mangueira 1980 350 350 700 Maracanã parking
Restinga 1994 150 total eviction 150 BRT Transoeste
Vila Autódromo 1985  — 500 500 BRT Transcarioca*
Vila Harmonia 1911 118 2 120 BRT Transoeste
Machado de Assis unknown — 150 150 Porto Maravilha
Pavão Pavãozinho 1930 300 — 300 Risk area
= 300 removals
Figure [1]
Figure 1: There is a clear correlation between Olympic sites and the favelas facing eviction. Favela evic-
tion points (red) are proportional to the scale of population being evicted to illustrate the magnitude. 
Adapted from a comprehensive study conducted by the activist organization Comité Popular da Copa e 
Olimpíadas (2011). 
= Olympic sites
Source: Comité Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas
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Figure 3: Olympic works in Providência 
and its surrounding area (top); Location of 
Providência in larger city context (bottom) 
(draws from Navarro-Sertich 2011).
Porto Maravilha
Olympic Village
Morro da Providência
Cable car line
Figure [2]
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Figure [3]
Figure 3: The route of this cable car cuts through the Provdência community. The Ladeira Barroso station 
sits at the former site of the Américo Brum Square. (Cidade Olímpica 2012).
Ladeira do Barroso Station
Gamboa Station
Central Station
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Figure [4]
Figure 4: Photographer Maruicio Hora protested the evictions by posting photos of residents outside their 
homes that were slated for eviction. The “SMH” marking in the bottom photo is the dreaded sign of the 
:LJYL[HYPV4\UPJPWHSKL/HIP[HsqV[OH[ZPNUPÄLZHOV\ZLZSH[LKMVYKLTVSP[PVU/VYHHUK>PSSPHTZVU
92
PAST THE FINISH LINE: 
THE FIVE EFFECTS OF STAGING AN OLYMPIC GAMES
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Figure [5]
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Figure 5: The Olympics play out through a number of dynamics and interactions (after Preuss 2004). 
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